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The growing threat of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and other terrorist 
organizations increases the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) chance of encountering an 
insider threat, which creates the need for the DoD to develop programs to address this 
concern and mitigate the risk to national security.  The purpose of this quantitative, 
nonexperimental study was to understand the effectiveness of security education, 
training, and awareness programs designed to mitigate insider threats within the DoD.  
Research questions were focused on this purpose as well as understanding why there is an 
increase in insider threats within the DoD.  The theoretical frameworks were based on 
Vincent and Elinor Ostrom’s institutional analysis development and Ott & Jang’s theory 
of organizational culture and change organizational behaviors.  A total of 42 DoD 
participants responded to a 10-question Likert-scale survey on Survey Monkey.  Based 
on the results, the DoD needs to retain both security education, training, and awareness 
computer-based training and instructor-based training programs to ensure insider threats 
are mitigated and to prevent known acts of espionage, unauthorized disclosure, or loss of 
organizational resources.  Implications for positive social change of these results include 
assisting the DoD with maintaining and developing programs to protect the warfighters 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is the country’s first line of defense 
against attacks from terrorists.  If the DoD cannot stop insider threats, then it jeopardizes 
the organization’s ability to protect U.S. citizens from acts of terrorism on U.S. soil.  
Recently apprehended insiders (e.g., Manning and Hasan) demonstrate America’s 
homegrown terrorist threats to the DoD and national security (Baker, 2012).  Therefore, 
the DoD must improve its stance on national security by thwarting insider threats.  
Insider threats have been identified as an issue to national security within the DoD and 
other government agencies (DoD, 1999).   
Despite mandatory security training, education and awareness programs for 
military, civilian, and contractors with access to DoD resources, insider threats continue 
to use authorized access to harm the security of the U.S. through espionage, terrorism, 
unauthorized disclosure of national security information, and/or through loss or 
degradation of resources or capabilities (DoD, 2017b).  For example, Private Bradley 
Manning was convicted in July 2013 of violation of the Espionage Act and other offenses 
after releasing the largest set of classified documents leaked to the public and was 
sentenced to 35 years in prison, though he was later pardoned in January 2017 and 
released on May 17, 2017.  Additionally, the DoD identified 87% of insider threats as 
employees or others internal to the organization who contemplate to divulge classified 
information, which threatens national security (Greitzer & Hohimer, 2011).  Therefore, 
insider threats continue to be a problem that needs to be monitored because of the current 
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threats to national security from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and Al 
Qaeda. 
Deterrence is key to protecting national security, especially when DoD publicizes 
the consequences of misuse, abuse, and malicious activity (DoD, 1999).  To accomplish 
the DoD’s mission to protect the United States from enemies foreign and domestic, 
insider threats must be immediately apprehended and prosecuted (Government 
Publishing Office, 2016; Willemssen, 2015).  However, the DoD has not identified a 
method or developed a system to measure the effectiveness of security education, 
training, and awareness programs, which are designed to ensure everyone understands the 
importance of identifying and reporting insider threats within their organization.  The 
purpose of this nonexperimental, quantitative study was to understand the effectiveness 
of security training, education, and awareness programs as it relates to DoD personnel.  
Overall, researchers can assist the DoD by conducting analysis on how well education, 
training, sharing and oversight efforts deter insider threats.   
Chapter 1 is broken down into several sections that will explain the importance of 
the study as well as the gaps in research.  For instance, the Background section overviews 
the importance of the study based on related articles which exposes the DoD’s 
vulnerabilities against insider threats.  The problem statement also covers the need for the 
DoD to thwart and mitigate insider threats through security training, education, and 
awareness programs designed to ensure everyone understands the importance of 




The Office of the Secretary of Defense/Command, Control, Communications, and 
Intelligence in conjunction with the DoD must review all security related education, 
training, and awareness programs to mitigate insider threats (DoD, 1999).  Although the 
DoD does not have a system or database dedicated to tracking insider events, 
characteristics, lessons learned, or statistics, the Carnegie Mellon’s Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CERT) developed a database that provides information and tools to 
policymakers, personnel security, and security education and training directorates (DoD, 
1999).  Additionally, army leaders must encourage subordinates to report insider threats; 
however, without effective security education, training, and awareness programs in place, 
identifying and reporting insider threats is difficult (DoD, 1999).  For example, Baker 
(2012) identified that the lack of these programs among Army leaders led to not 
identifying Major Nadal Hasan’s sympathy toward ISIS and other terrorist organizations.  
Therefore, there is a need to improve the effectiveness of the current programs to 
identify, deter, and mitigate insider threats.   
DoD regulations and policies were revised in 2015 to ensure personnel (i.e., 
military, civilian, and government contractors are provided annual security training, 
education, and awareness.  However, the effectiveness of this training is not being 
measured by the DoD, which prevents military personnel, DoD civilians, and contractors 
from understanding the importance of identifying and reporting insider threats within 
their organization.  The DoD is also unaware of the effectiveness of security education, 
training, and awareness programs in general because it has not conducted evaluations or 
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tests through military training exercises.  Further, although President Obama signed 
Presidential Executive Order 13587 to improve structural reforms on protecting and 
securing classified networks and safeguarding classified information within government 
agencies (Kirschbaum, 2015), government agencies and organizations, such as the DoD, 
struggle to improve and maintain effective security training, education, and awareness 
programs due to a lack of funding (Johnson, 2013).  But the DoD and other agencies must 
be prepared to protect information, resources, and facilities from insider threats.  
Therefore, it is important to measure the effectiveness of such programs to ensure 
deterrence, identification, and mitigation of insider threats, which this study addresses. 
Problem Statement 
According to the United States Army 902nd Intelligence Group (2016), there are 
specific indicators that put an individual at risk of becoming an insider threat: 
1. Encouraging disruptive behavior or disobedience to lawful order;  
2. Expressing hatred or intolerance of American society or culture;  
3. Expressing sympathy for organization that promote violence;  
4. Expressing extreme anxiety about or refusing a deployment;  
5. Associating with or expressing loyalty or support for terrorists;  
6. Browsing websites that promote or advocate violence against the United 
States, or distributing terrorist literature or propaganda via the internet;  
7. Expressing extreme outrage against U.S. military operations;  
8. Advocating violence to achieve political/religious/ideological goals;  
9. Providing financial or other materiel support to a terrorist organization;  
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10. Seeking spiritual sanctioning for or voicing an obligation to engage in 
violence in support of a radical or extremist organization or cause;  
11. Membership in a violent, extremist or terrorist group, or adopting an ideology 
that advocates violence, extremism, or radicalism;  
12. Purchasing bomb making materials or obtaining information on bomb 
construction and use;  
13. Engaging in paramilitary training with radical or extremist organizations, 
either home or abroad;  
14. Having ties to know or suspected international terrorists, extremists, radicals, 
or their supporters; and  
15. An employee released from or not selected for employment, promotion, or 
bonus; who exhibits server signs of PTSD, and who appears disgruntled and 
violent.  
Examples of insider threats include former Army Private Bradley Manning and Army 
Major Nidal Hasan (Koester, 2013).  On May 17, 2017, Manning was released after only 
serving 7 years of a 35-year sentence, whereas Nidal remains on death row.  The DoD 
identified these individuals as insider threats after Manning provided classified 
documents to WikiLeaks and Hasan killed and wounded soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas 
(Thompson, 2014).   
An insider threat is an individual who can intentionally or unintentionally harm 
national security through acts of espionage and unauthorized disclosure of classified 
information causing a loss of degradation to operational capabilities and resources 
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(Defense Security Service Regulation, 2014).  Additionally, an insider threat can 
negatively impact national security resulting in loss of life, compromising and disclosing 
classified information and systems, and causing economic loss due to the cloning or 
destruction of major weapons systems and loss of technology (Defense Security Service, 
2014).  There are several categories of insider threats: foreign agents stealing classified 
information, workers angry with management leaving for a new job, and greedy workers 
willing to engage in espionage (Magnuson & Sicard, 2015).  Historically, DoD insider 
threats have been middle-aged males with an agenda to commit espionage and disclose 
classified information to foreign governments (Herbig, 2017).   
After several insider threat attacks within the DoD, there is a need to improve 
security education, training, and awareness programs (Kirschbaum, 2015).  Additionally, 
security experts from CERT and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigated 
insider threats in 2012 by assessing archetypes and employee impressions and found that 
70% of respondents said they do not have enough information or tools to be proactive in 
identifying insider threats (Magnuson, 2014).  Despite programs in place, the 
effectiveness of DoD’s insider threat security education, training, and awareness 
programs have not been evaluated.  This study was conducted to identify the perceived 
effectiveness of DoD’s security education, training, and awareness programs provided to 




Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to understand the effectiveness of the 
security education, training, and awareness programs currently provided to military, 
civilian, and government contractors with access to DoD resources, organizations, and 
facilities.  Although DoD has several types of security education, training, and awareness 
programs, this study included comparing the effectiveness of computer-based training 
(CBT) and instructor-based training (IBT).  Institutional analysis development (IAD) and 
the theory of organizational culture and change guided the study as it relates to security 
education, training, and awareness programs of insider threats within the DoD.  The 
independent variables were DoD CBT versus IBT programs designed to mitigate insider 
threats in which criterion determines whether the effectiveness of security education, 
training, and awareness CBT or IBT programs changes attitudes, improve knowledge or 
increase skills in identifying an insider threat.  The dependent variables were known acts 
of espionage, unauthorized disclosure of information, and any activity resulting in the 
intentional or unintentional loss of organizational resources and/or capabilities from the 
actions of an insider.  Control and intervening variables were gender and military and 
civilian status (e.g., noncommissioned officer, DoD civilian, etc.).   
Research Questions  
RQ1: What is the perceived effectiveness of CBT and IBT programs in mitigating 
and thwarting insider threats within the DoD? 
H01: There is no statistically significant difference between the perceived 
effectiveness of CBT and IBT programs in mitigating and thwarting insider threats. 
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H11: There is a statistically significant difference between the perceived 
effectiveness of CBT and IBT programs in mitigating and thwarting insider threats. 
RQ2: What is the perceived effectiveness of CBT and IBT programs in preventing 
known acts of espionage, unauthorized disclosure, or loss of organizational resources?  
H02: There is no statistically significant difference between the effectiveness of 
CBT and IBT programs in preventing known acts of espionage, unauthorized disclosure, 
or loss of organizational resources. 
H12: There is a statistically significant difference between the effectiveness of 
CBT and IBT programs in preventing known acts of espionage, unauthorized disclosure, 
or loss of organizational resources. 
Theoretical Framework  
IAD and the theory of organizational culture and change are the theoretical 
frameworks that best suit this study because both are systematic ways of studying 
institutional organizations and their cultural impact on organizational realities and 
relationships.  In 1971, Vincent and Elinor Ostrom developed the IAD framework as a 
systematic way of studying institutional arrangements.  Ostrom’s IAD framework 
suggests the direct impact of operational decisions of decision-makers such as Army 
leaders (i.e., commanders, platoon leaders, senior executive service, etc.), who are 
required to make policy decisions within the constraints of a set of collective rules 
created within an organization such as the DoD.  The IAD draws out assumptions about 
rules ranging from statutes to patterns of behavior (Sabatier & Weible, 2014).   
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In contrast, the theory of organizational culture and change organizational 
behaviors and decisions are predetermined by assumptions of members within an 
organization (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2016).  For example, research has shown an increase 
in insider threats within the DoD because leadership did not identify patterns of behavior 
exhibited by insider threats or make changes to its current culture (Baker, 2012).  This led 
to Presidential Executive Order 13587 (Kirschbaum, 2015).  Although the DoD’s culture 
accepts the fact that changes must be implemented to prevent insider threats, they are 
slow to make changes because of the organizational culture of each military service (i.e., 
Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps) (Kirschbaum, 2015). As a result, each 
military service must work together to develop a tracking system based on lessons 
learned, after action reviews, and assessments.  Presidential Executive Order 13587 was 
aimed to change the organizational culture by making changes to how each organization 
shares information on a joint database (Kirschbaum, 2015).  In 2016, DoD is in the 
process of developing such a database, which will monitor, analyze and identify insider 
threats in accordance with Executive Order 13587. 
Nature of the Study 
The nature of this study was quantitative and nonexperimental, focused focus on 
the effectiveness of security training, education, and awareness and its relationship to 
identifying and reporting insider threats.  A survey was used to assess the benefits and 
risks of security training, education, and awareness and its effectiveness on identifying 
and reporting insider threats within the DoD.  The design was focused on a limited 
number of independent (security education, training, and awareness programs) and 
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dependent (insider threats) variables.  The independent variables were be DoD programs 
designed to mitigate and thwart insider threats in which criterion determines whether the 
effectiveness of security education, training, and awareness CBT or IBT programs 
changes attitudes, improve knowledge or increase skills in identifying an insider threat.  
The dependent variables were acts of espionage, unauthorized disclosure of information, 
and any activity resulting in the intentional or unintentional loss of organizational 
resources and/or capabilities from the actions of an insider (Defense Security Service, 
2014).   
The quantitative research design allowed for a statistical analysis using Two-way 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to analyze data collected from the surveys as well as a 
means for determining relationships between independent and dependent variables and 
their effect on identifying, mitigating, and eliminating insider threats within the DoD.  A 
comprehensive survey was used to collect data from military personnel (i.e., enlisted, 
noncommissioned officers, warrant officers, and commissioned officers) and government 
civilians (i.e., general schedule [GS] and senior executive service contractors and 
information technology, engineers, logisticians, etc.) from military installations across the 
United States.  The survey was distributed electronically to participants to determine if 
the effectiveness of security education, training, and awareness programs helps them 
understand how to identify and report insider threats within their respective 
organizations.  Thus, this study helps reflect the need to modify existing or develop new 
methods to identify and report insider threats within the DoD by identifying any 




Classified information:  Information that has been determined pursuant to any 
successor order, Executive Order 12951 or any successor order, or the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011), to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and 
that it is marked to indicate its classified status when in documentary form (Defense 
Security Regulation 05-06, 2014). 
Department of Defense (DoD) personnel:  Active and reserve (National Guard 
and Army Reserve) military personnel as well as DoD civilian employees (DoD 
Instruction 5240.26; DoD, 2012). 
Espionage:  The act of obtaining, delivering, transmitting, communicating or 
receiving information in respect to the national defense with an intent or reason to believe 
that the information could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of 
any foreign nation and not pursuant to an international agreement duly entered in to by 
the United States (Army Regulation 381-12). 
Information:  Any knowledge that can be communicated or documentary 
material, regardless of its physical form or characteristics, which is owned by, is 
produced by or for, or is under the control of the U.S. Government (Defense Security 
Service Regulation 05-06, 2014).  
Insider threat:  As defined by the Defense Security Service, a threat that an 
insider will use his/her authorized access, wittingly or unwittingly, to do harm to the 
security of the United States.  This threat can include damage to the United States 
through violent acts, espionage, terrorism, unauthorized disclosure of national security 
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information, or through the loss, denial or degradation of departmental resources or 
capabilities (Defense Security Service Regulation 05-06, 2014).   
Insider:  Any person with authorized access to any U.S. Government resource, to 
include personnel, facilities, information, equipment, networks, or systems (Defense 
Security Service Regulation 05-06, 2014). 
Security education and training:  Formal activities, products, and services 
intended to create or enhance the security knowledge or skills of persons or raise their 
level of performance, motivation, or operations (DoD Instruction 3305.13, 2014). 
Unauthorized disclosure:  Communication, confirmation, acknowledgement, or 
physical transfer of classified information or controlled unclassified information, 
including the facilitation of, or actual giving, passing, selling, publishing, or in any way 
making such information available to an unauthorized recipient (Defense Security 
Service Regulation 05-06, 2014). 
Assumptions 
The positivist paradigm is based on the belief that knowledge is gained from data 
that can be directly experienced and verified between independent observers to test a 
hypothesis through measurement (Goduka, 2012).  Although researchers have argued that 
positivism is based on values of reason, truth, and validity (Blaikie, 1993; Saunders, 
Lewis, & Thornhill, 2007; Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & 
Jackson, 2008; Hatch & Cunliffe, 2006), the positivist paradigm involved seeing the 
world as having a single reality that can be independently observed and measured and 
where researchers can passively collect and interpret data using tools such as surveys and 
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statistical analysis software (Goduka, 2012).  Therefore, aligning positivism with the 
quantitative research approach permits scientific research through observation and 
measurement (Goduka, 2012). 
Additionally, the meta-theoretical paradigms underlying a quantitative versus 
qualitative approach was taken into consideration (Gelo, Braakmann, & Benetka, 2008; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Noblitt & Hare, 1988; Rosenberg, 1988).  Quantitative 
approaches tend to explain phenomena and their relationship to confirm predictions made 
by a theory, whereas qualitative approaches tend to comprehend personal perspectives, 
experiences, and understandings of the individual actors (Gelo et al., 2008).  Further, 
qualitative approaches make use of naturalistic designs to study behavior in natural 
settings (i.e., naturalistic designs; Lincoln & Guba, 1985), but my study was based on a 
nonexperimental quantitative research approach in which the independent variable cannot 
be manipulated and the research design will describe the relationship between two or 
more variables of interest (Gelo et al., 2008).   
Scope and Delimitations 
The DoD is the largest employer in the world with more than 3 million active, 
Reserve, and National Guard military members and civilian workforce (DoD, 2016). This 
study was focused on indicators that identify insider threats and the effectiveness of 
security education, training, and awareness.  To conduct this study, a subset of the 
population and sample size were selected from the DoD. The subset of the population and 
sample size will consist of DoD personnel (active, Reserve, and National Guard soldiers, 
civilians, and contractors) who possess an active security clearance (secret or top secret), 
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that live and work in the United States, and have been employed by the federal 
government for at least five years. 
Furthermore, the dependent variables for this research study were acts of 
espionage, unauthorized disclosure of information, and any activity resulting in the 
intentional and unintentional loss of organizational resources and/or capabilities from the 
actions of an insider.  Independent variables were programs designed to mitigate insider 
threats in which criterion determine whether effectiveness of training, education, and 
awareness programs changes attitudes, improves knowledge, or increases skills in 
identifying an insider threat.  The control and intervening variables are gender and 
military and civilian status (e.g., noncommissioned officer, DoD civilian, etc.). The 
covariates are based on demographics within the DoD.  An insider threat can be a male or 
female, a military member, civilian or contractor.  Therefore, analyzing and reporting this 
data will provide the DoD with information needed to improve current security training, 
education, and awareness programs among military personnel, government civilians and 
contractors with access to DoD facilities and organizations (i.e., Army, Air Force, Navy, 
and Marine Corps)  
Sampling Strategy 
The use of stratified sampling will address the research questions and hypotheses 
based on the variables (independent and dependent) for this study.  Nonprobability 
sample designs (convenience, snowball, purposive, and quota samples) were not designed 
to answer the research questions or hypotheses based on the effectiveness of security 
education, training, and awareness on identifying insider threats within the DoD.  
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Moreover, the remaining probability sample designs (simple random, systematic, and 
cluster sampling) were also not the best choice for selecting sampling size for this study. 
Limitations 
This study is limited to DoD personnel (i.e., civilians, government contractors, 
etc.).  The DoD is the nation’s largest employer with over 3 million employees located all 
over the world (DoD, 2016).  Therefore, the study was limited to the DoD as the source 
of data collection.  This study will include military, civilian, and contractors from all of 
the military services to ensure validity of the research results.  However, there may be 
biases from senior leadership (military and civilian).  These biases will be addressed in 
the letter to respondents explaining the importance of the study in identifying and 
reporting insider threats based on current security education, training, and awareness 
programs.   
The final limitation is the amount of time needed by respondents to complete the 
survey.  Personnel needed an adequate amount of time at work to complete the survey.  
The 10-question survey should take 30 minutes to complete and submit.  The survey 
consisted of closed-ended questions based on demographics (i.e., military rank, branch of 
service, civilian grade, etc.) and assessed perceptions of DoD personnel on whether 
current insider threat training is effective.   
Significance 
The effects of security education, training, and awareness programs on an 
employees’ capability to identify and report insider threats is important to the community 
and society because the DoD is the United States’ first line of defense against all foreign 
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and domestic enemies.  After 13 years of war, protecting national security has increased 
U.S. citizens’ trust and dependence on the nation’s all volunteer force to provide a safe 
haven against terrorism.  However, recent disclosures of classified documents and 
information by insider threats are a concern, and research (e.g., Government 
Accountability Office [GAO] reports and CERT) has shown that mandatory security 
training, education, and awareness programs are necessary to prevent insider threats.  
Because the DoD has not developed a specific program or system to identify insider 
threats, it is important for the DoD to improve its current mandatory training programs 
and develop a database to identify and track characteristics of insider threats.  
This research addresses gaps in the literature on the effectives of security 
education, training, and awareness programs when identifying and reporting insider 
threats and provides the DoD with important resources regarding oversight of a very 
sensitive issue.  The DoD has a mission to protect national security from enemies foreign 
and domestic.  Protecting classified information and documents from being compromised 
by insider threats within the DoD protects U.S. citizens from terrorist attacks in the U.S. 
and abroad.  Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the Boston Marathon 
in 2013, U.S. citizens live in a world of uncertainty.  Therefore, DoD’s security 
education, training, and awareness programs play an important role in ensuring U.S. 
citizens live and work in a safe and secure environment.  This research will assist the 
DoD with development and implementation of security education, training, and 




This quantitative study was focused on the perceived effectiveness of security 
education, training and awareness of insider threats within the DoD.  Reports from the 
GAO and DoD regulations and policies, as well as journals and articles, have recognized 
the need to identify insider threats and improve security education, training, and 
awareness programs.  Leaking information to weaken national security makes an insider 
threat dangerous.  The DoD must understand how and why insider threats exist and how 
to stop them from committing acts of espionage, which necessitated this study to help 
understand the effectiveness of security education, training, and awareness programs of 
insider threats that can help prevent insider threats within the DoD.   
Chapter 2 will focus on the literature review based on DoD regulations and 
articles on the importance of mitigating and addressing insider threats within the DoD.  
The chapter is also focused on the theoretical frameworks for the study: IAD and the 
theory of organizational culture and change structure  Furthermore, Chapter 2 provides 
additional literature and research-based analysis on insider threats and the importance of 
mitigating insider threats based on security education, training and awareness programs, 
protecting classified information systems, antiterrorism/force protection, cybersecurity, 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
After several recent insider threat attacks within the DoD, there is a need to 
improve security education, training, and awareness programs.  The purpose of this 
quantitative study was to understand the effectiveness of these current programs provided 
to military, civilian, and government contractors with access to DoD resources, 
organizations, and facilities.  Programs such as the Threat Awareness and Reporting 
Program (TARP) and DoD mandatory online training courses (i.e., security education 
training awareness, and antiterrorism/force protection training; see Table 1) are designed 
to inform and identify types of behaviors of potential insider threats and are required to 
be completed prior to the end of the fiscal year (October 1–September 30).  TARP 
training is presented by a qualified counterintelligence agent and covers a variety of 
topics ranging from espionage to insider threats.   
Table 1 
 









Loss of Organizational 
Resources 
TARP Annual Yes Yes Yes 
SETA Varies Yes Yes Yes 
OPSEC Annual Yes Yes Yes 
AT/FP Annual Yes Yes Yes 
Note. SETA = Security Education Training Awareness, AT/FP = Antiterrorism/Force 
Protection, OPSEC = Operations Security 
Chapter 2 will cover the research literature search strategy, theoretical foundation, 
and literature review of peer-reviewed articles, DoD regulations and policies, and U.S. 
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government policies and statues based on insider threats.  The literature search strategy 
involved the use of keywords relevant to the insider threats within the DoD.  The 
theoretical foundation describes how the IAD and theory of organizational culture and 
change best suits the research study of insider threats.  Finally, the literature review will 
shed light on the published articles related to the research study of insider threats. 
Literature Search Strategy 
The literature search strategy involved the use of keywords and search engines 
from U.S. government and military databases.  Research articles and peer-reviewed 
military related journals were obtained from Walden University library’s U.S. 
government and military databases and Google Scholar using the following keywords:  
insider threats, Department of Defense, behavior, mitigation, oversight, security, 
training, and education.  Although the Walden University library has several peer-
reviewed databases, the military databases were best suited for this research.  The 
following military databases were used:  Military and Government Collection and the 
Homeland Security Digital Library.  Searching both databases using the keywords 
resulted in obtaining the articles used in this research study.  Additionally, Zotoro was 
used to organize articles based on the keywords used in the literature search strategy, 
which aligned with American Psychological Association guidelines. 
Although there is little research about insider threats within the DoD, the articles 
found in the search provided valuable information about the importance of mitigating 
insider threats within the DoD.  Furthermore, literature used in this study was gleaned 
from GAO reports, which conducted several investigations into insider threat incidents.  
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Incidents such as the shootings at Fort Hood, Texas and the Washington Naval Yard 
involved individuals who had access to classified information and systems and an intent 
to harm national security.  Additional documentation was obtained in the search such as a 
presidential executive order and memorandum and articles from National Defense and 
Federal Times journals as well as U.S. government policies and laws and DoD policies 
and regulations.  The research database results provided literature and resources as far 
back as 1999.  The most recent literature was written in 2017 and provides an in-depth 
explanation of current insider threats and the training designed to identify them.   
Theoretical Foundation 
The IAD and the theory of organizational culture and change are the theoretical 
frameworks that best suit this research study.  The IAD draws out assumptions about 
rules ranging from highly visible statutes to patterns of behavior (Sabatier & Weible, 
2014).  The theory of organizational culture and change organizational behaviors and 
decisions are predetermined by assumptions of members within an organization (Shafritz 
et al., 2016). 
Institutional Analysis Development 
In 1971, Vincent and Elinor Ostrom developed the IAD to study institutional 
arrangements.  The Ostroms wanted to understand how diverse paradigms in political 
science affect the way scholars conceptualized public administration and metropolitan 
organization (Sabatier & Weible, 2014).  The IAD framework consisted of four building 
blocks modeled after the individual, the world of events, decision-making arrangements, 
and evaluative criteria applied to outcomes (Sabatier & Weible, 2014).  Additionally, the 
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IAD framework was based on the efforts of scholars who wanted to engage and 
understand problem solving.  These scholars were in a quest to devise institutional 
arrangements in how people solve collective action problems and how to apply it as a 
means to share problems that people were attempting to resolve.   
The IAD is incorporated in DoD’s preparation to conduct military operations by 
focusing on joint military intelligence and civil considerations (Whitfield, 2012).  
Military leaders use a variety of scholarly disciplines, such as anthropology, sociology, 
psychology, economics, and political science, when deciding how to decisively conduct 
military operations.  Likewise, the human dimension is a part of the military’s operational 
environment and is composed of multiple fluctuating variables such as individuals, 
groups, organizations, culture, history, and terrain.  These considerations are incorporated 
into the military’s intelligence preparation of the battlefield, which gives them an 
advantage.  Thus, the DoD can take the same approach when addressing insider threats.   
The DoD’s approach is based on which definition best describes an insider threat.  
Leaders must not only understand the definition, but they must be able to identify the 
behavior and ideology of an insider threat.  The Joint Publication 3-24 (2017) indicates 
that an insider threat is a nontraditional threat that undermines counterinsurgency 
operations, whereas the U.S. Army military intelligence community defines an insider 
threat as 
A person with placement and access who intentionally causes loss or degradation 
of resources or capabilities or compromises the ability of an organization to 
accomplish its mission through espionage, providing support to international 
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terrorism, or the unauthorized release or disclosure of information about the plans 
and intention of the U.S. military forces. (Army Regulation 381-12, 2010) 
Further, the DoD must consider an insider threat as the enemy within their organization.  
Not only are insider threats the enemy, but they are homegrown terrorist not necessarily 
tied to an organized terrorist effort (Baker, 2012).  Although intelligence operations have 
changed since the Cold War, there has also been a shift to nonstate actors and asymmetric 
threat tactics following September 11, 2001.  To identify and report insider threats, 
military leaders should incorporate cultural intelligence into doctrinal procedures that are 
used to conduct intelligence preparation of the operational environment (Whitfield, 
2012).  The IAD framework facilitates an understanding of the human domain by 
integrating social science concepts, which can help DoD leadership formulate policy 
decisions (Whitfield, 2012).  The framework can impact how DoD leadership approaches 
its decision making when it relates to the effectiveness of security education, training, 
and awareness programs to prevent insider threats.   
Organizational Culture and Change 
Organizational culture exists within an organization and is composed of many 
intangible phenomena such as values, beliefs, assumptions, perceptions, behavioral 
norms, artifacts, and patterns of behavior (Shafritz et al., 2016).  The literature on 
organizational culture has had a dominant theme since the 1980s and tends to reflect 
unwanted values, such as hierarchy, rigidity, homogeneity, power based on authority, and 
associations in closed networks.  Organizational culture and change are reliant on rules 
that restrict flexibility and can be barriers to effecting lasting change.  In other words, 
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organizational members want to hold on to familiar beliefs, values, policies and practices 
that they belief serve the organization well.  However, it is important for these “command 
and control” cultures to understand the importance in making changes that encourage and 
support employee participation and empowerment as well as a more diverse workforce. 
Despite the research on organization culture, senior military leaders may not 
understand the complex task of implementing organizational culture and change within 
the DoD, which needs both leadership and management (Kelly, 2008).  Annual threat 
assessments like the one presented by former U.S. Army Lieutenant General Michael 
Flynn have reported how trusted insiders’ intent to do harm by exploiting their access to 
compromise vast amounts of sensitive and classified information were based on personal 
ideology or at the direction of a foreign government (Flynn, 2014).  However, the 
“command and control” culture can lead to not addressing potential threats such as not 
discharging Nidal Hasan from the Army despite reports of radical behavior at his 
previous duty station (Baker, 2012).  Although change is difficult, leaders can create a 
plan to work diligently in shaping the environment and the organizational culture and 
change to effect a change (Kelly, 2008). For example, for the Joint Fires Observer to 
succeed, the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force signed a memorandum of agreement that 
outlined an understanding of how each organization would operate and coexist within the 
Joint Fires Observer despite each other’s differences in command climate and culture.  
Leading from the authority of their position and providing follow-up assessments and 
guidance can ensure that change is a success, which is important to addressing insider 
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threats within the DoD because military and civilian leaders are responsible for the 
successful implementation of security education, training, and awareness programs. 
Literature and Research Based Analysis 
Executive Order 13587, which was created to address insider threats, recognized 
the DoD in conjunction with the National Security Agency as the lead executive agents 
for safeguarding classified information on computer networks as well as establishing an 
Insider Threat Task Force co-chaired by the Attorney General and the Director of 
National Intelligence, or their designees.  However, according to a GAO report, the DoD 
had only complied with the minimum standards outlined in Executive Order 13587 
(Kirschbaum, 2015).  Although the DoD’s culture accepts the fact that changes must be 
implemented to address insider threats, military leadership is slow to make changes 
because of the organizational culture of the DoD.  Therefore, the IAD and organizational 
culture and change are the best theoretical frameworks for this study on the effectiveness 
of security education, training, and security awareness programs on mitigating insider 
threats because DoD must change their organizational culture to prevent insider threats.  
These theoretical frameworks have strategic implications for military leaders and scholars 
and can ensure through security education, training, and awareness programs that 
personnel (i.e., military, civilian, etc.) recognize and report insider threats based on 
current policies and laws.  Applying multiple echelon approach and scenario-based 
approaches (i.e., modeling software, etc.) can mitigate insider threats (Baker, 2012).  
Although insider threats are a high risk to national security, the DoD must work as one 
organization to address them. 
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Literature Review Related to Key Variables and Concepts 
Espionage 
DoD training involves threat awareness programs developed to inform and train 
soldier, civilians, and contractors against espionage and insider threat (Baker, 2012).  
Army Regulation 381-12 (2016), TARP, defines espionage as  
The act of obtaining, delivering, transmitting, communicating or receiving 
information in respect to the national defense with an intent or reason to believe 
that the information could be used to the injury of the United States or to the 
advantage of any Foreign Nation and not pursuant to an international agreement 
duly entered into by the United States.  
Committing espionage against the United States is a crime in which service members are 
charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice 906a. Article 106a. Spies/Espionage.  
According to Article 106a., no person may be sentenced by court-martial to suffer death 
for an offense under this article unless the member of the court-martial finds at least one 
of the aggravating factors set out in subsection (c), and the members unanimously 
determine that the aggravating circumstances or factors outweigh other circumstances.  
Subsection (c) states that a sentence of death may be given only if the members 
unanimously find, beyond a reasonable doubt, one or more of the following aggravating 
factors:  being convicted of another offense involving espionage or treason for which 
either a sentence of death or imprisonment for life was authorized by statute, knowingly 
creating a grave risk of substantial damage to the national security or risk of death to 
26 
 
another person, and any other factor that may be prescribed by the president by 
regulations under section 836 of this title (Article 36). 
The Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC) was created 
in 1986 to perform behavioral science research on personnel security policies and 
practices after John Walker, a U.S. Navy cryptographic radioman, committed espionage 
in 1985.  Furthermore, to improve security education and awareness, PERSEREC 
published unclassified analytical reports about espionage for public distribution.  In 
PERSEREC’s fourth series of unclassified analytical reports on espionage, Herbig (2017) 
compared data across three cohorts of persons based on the time period they committed 
espionage.  The three cohorts are as follows:  1947–1979 (Early Cold War), 1980-1989 
(Later Cold War), and 1990-2015 (post-Soviet period).  Since 1990, three-quarters of 
espionage-related offenses have been committed by civil servants and one-quarter 
military personnel as compared to the previous two cohorts where an increased 
proportion were contractors or have held jobs not related to espionage or have not held 
security clearances (Herbig, 2017).   
For decades, insiders with privileged access to classified or sensitive information 
betrayed the U.S. by committing espionage.  In 2013 and 2015, there were two cases of 
espionage and unauthorized disclosure of information by insiders within the DoD 
(Lamothe, 2016).  In 2013, an Army military police officer, Specialist William Colton 
Millay, was sentenced to 16 years of confinement for trying to sell military secrets to an 
FBI agent (Thiessen, 2013).  In 2015, Navy Lieutenant Commander Edward Lin was 
secretly arrested in Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service for 
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communicating secret information with intent or reason to believe it would be used to the 
advantage of a foreign nation and other charges.  The Naval Criminal Investigative 
Service and the FBI were investigating whether Lieutenant Commander Lin passed 
classified information to both China and Taiwan (Lamothe, 2016; Larter, 2017).  As of 
May 4, 2017, Lin pled guilty of communicating national defense information under the 
Federal Espionage Act as well as guilty to offenses of orders violations and making false 
official statements under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.  On June 2, 2017, Lin was 
sentenced to 6 years in prison (WFMY, 2017). 
Another case of an insider threat was in 2010, when Army Specialist Bradley 
Manning was arrested while deployed to Iraq and detained in Kuwait after providing 
unauthorized disclosure of classified information to Wiki Leaks (Tate, 2010).  During his 
court-martial, Manning was demoted to Private First Class and detained in the Quantico 
Confinement Facility at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia.  Manning was sentenced 
to 35 years and dishonorably discharged from the military in 2013 (Martinez & Saenz, 
2013; Tate, 2013).  Although Manning was sentenced to 35 years at the U.S. Disciplinary 
Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, he only served seven years of his sentence.  
President Barack H. Obama commuted his sentence in 2017 (Savage, 2017).  Manning 
was released from U.S. Disciplinary Barracks May 17, 2017 (Onyanga-Omara & Vanden 
Brook, 2017). 
Further, leaks by Manning in 2010 and Snowden in 2013 are quite common 
(Herbig, 2017).  For example, between 2005 and 2009, 153 suspected cases were referred 
to the Department of Justice.  However, the Department of Justice opened only 26 cases 
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and identified 14 suspects, none of which led to an indictment (Harris, 2010; LaFraniere, 
2013). 
Unauthorized Disclosure 
Unauthorized disclosure is a communication or physical transfer of classified 
information or controlled unclassified information to an unauthorized recipient (Center 
for Development of Security Excellence, 2017).  Unauthorized disclosure can occur 
intentionally or accidentally through leaks, data spills, espionage, or not following proper 
safeguarding procedures.   
Leaks are deliberate disclosures of information to the media.  Examples of leaks 
are information about top secret government surveillance programs to news outlets and 
Manning’s intentional leak of thousands of classified documents to WikiLeaks.   
Data spills are willful, negligent, or inadvertent disclosures of classified 
information or controlled unclassified information across computer systems.  For 
example, opening information from the Secured Internet Protocol Router Network on the 
Nonsecured Internet Protocol Router Network) can create the potential for rapid and 
widespread unauthorized disclosure causing a data spill or negligent discharge of 
classified information. Data spills (negligent discharges of classified information) are 
considered a possible compromise of classified information.  The most common data 
spills (negligent discharges of classified information) are through an email or publicly 
accessible internet sites.   
Unauthorized disclosure due to improper safeguarding procedures is usually 
unintentional but can be just as damaging to national security as leaks, data spills, and 
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espionage.  Examples of improper safeguarding procedures is leaving a classified 
document on a photocopier, forgetting to security classified documents before leaving the 
office, discussing classified information within an earshot of unauthorized recipients, and 
dual-use technology (used for military and commercial use).    
According the Gaston (2017), damage caused by unauthorized disclosures is 
based on the following three levels of classification:  confidential, secret, and top secret.  
Confidential is the lowest level of classification in which unauthorized disclosure can 
cause “damage” to national security.  Unauthorized exposure of secret information can 
cause “grave damage” to national security while “exceptionally grave damage” to 
national security is caused by unauthorized exposure of top-secret information.  Each 
level of classification is designed to compartmentalize information to allow only persons 
cleared at the appropriate level access to information (Young, 2017). 
On September 8, 2017, the White House issued the following guidance: 
“Unauthorized disclosure of classified information or controlled unclassified U.S. 
Government information causes harm to our nation and shakes the confidence of the 
American people.”  Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) published 
Executive Order (EXORD) 009-18, DoD Training on Unauthorized Disclosure, on 
September 19, 2017.  EXORD 009-18 directed every DoD department and agency to 
dedicate one hour, during the month of October 2017, to engage their organization in 
discussion on the importance of protecting classified and controlled unclassified 
information and measures to prevent and detect unauthorized disclosures.   
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Unauthorized disclosure of information harms the U.S. through damage to 
national security and loss of life, money, public trust and confidence and a way of life.  It 
also undermines ongoing and planned military operations, damages intelligence methods 
and sources, impacts our international alliances and foreign policy and benefits 
adversaries wishing to harm the U.S. 
Those involved in unauthorized disclosure may face serious consequences.  After 
the investigation is conducted, military commanders and supervisors may consider and 
impose a wide range of sanctions and actions against those responsible for unauthorized 
disclosure of classified information.  These consequences can take the form of Uniform 
Code of Military Justice sanctions, civil litigation, and administrative and/or criminal 
sanctions.  Many of these sanctions were imposed on Bradley Manning for his 
unauthorized disclosure to WikiLeaks. 
Intentional and Unintentional Insider Threats 
Threats may be intentional or unintentional and can come from internal and 
external sources (Yaokumuh & Kumuh, 2018).  According to the CERT Insider Threat 
Team, both intentional and unintentional insider threats are characterized based on the 
sociological context of trust, workplace behaviors, and fallibility (CERT, 2013).  
Intentional insider threats tend to originate from malicious intentions and seek to harm an 
organization’s information assets.  Furthermore, intentional insider threats are more 
dangerous because they deliberately access information in an unauthorized manner and 
are usually technically capable of using social engineering techniques along with 
sophisticated technical expertise to gain unauthorized access to an organization’s 
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valuable resources (Omar, 2015).  On the other hand, an unintentional insider threat lacks 
the understanding of security policy and does not conform to security awareness and 
training programs (Omar, 2015).  However, enforcing clear security policies and 
guidelines are effective ways to mitigate intentional and unintentional insider threats 
within an organization. 
For example, U.S. Government nuclear facilities are improving insider threat 
training, awareness programs, and mitigation by using tabletop exercises developed by 
Sandia National Laboratories (Abbott, 2017).  One of the tabletop exercises uses a case 
study to highlight intentional and unintentional insider threats (Abbott, 2017).    
 
Figure 1. 2015 military personnel and DoD civilians demographics report. This pie chart 
presents all branches of the military (active duty, Reserve and National Guard) and the 
Department of Homeland Security Coast Guard, as well as DoD civilian personnel who 
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support the DoD, DoD Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military 
Community and Family Policy (2015). 
 
 
Figure 2. Enlisted members and officers in the total military force. 
This pie chart represents the total number of active duty and selected Reserve enlisted 
members (noncommission officers [NCOs]/petty officers [POs]) and officers 
(commissioned and warrant officers) across the DOD.  Overall, the total DoD force is 
composed of 1,759,755 (83%) enlisted members and 360,750 (17%) officers, Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC), 2015. Note that the percentages may not total to 100 
due to rounding. Source: DMDC Active Duty Military Personnel Master File (September 
2015); DMDC Reserve Components Common Personnel Data System (September 2015) 
The DoD employs over 3 million individuals all over the world.  Figures 1 and 2 








DoD civilians.  Whereas Figures 3 and 4 below depict the graphical analysis of both 
appropriated and nonappropriated DoD civilian employees.  The data and support for the 
graphical analysis was provided by the DMDC and published in the Office of the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Community and Family Policy 2015 report. 
Officer 
The DoD officer ranks consider of commissioned officers and warrant officers.  
The commissioned ranks are the highest in the military.  Military officers hold 
presidential commissions and their ranks are confirmed by the U.S. Senate.  Army, Air 
Force and Marine Corps officers are called company grade officers in the pay grades of 
O-1 to O-3, field grade officers in the pay grades of O-4 to O-6 and general officers in 
pay grades O-7 and higher.  The Navy’s equivalent officer groupings are called junior 
grade, mid-grade and flag.   
Warrant officers are specialists and experts in certain military occupational 
specialties and hold warrants from their service secretary.  The lowest ranking warrant 
officers serve under a warrant, but they receive commissions from the president upon 
promotion to chief warrant officer 2.  Although warrant officers derive their authority 
from the same source as commissioned officers, they remain specialists in contrast to 
commissioned officers who are generalists.  There are no warrant officers in the Air 
Force.   
Enlisted 
Enlisted service members in the pay grades of E-1 through E-4 are usually either 
in training status or on their initial assignment.  According to Enlisted Leaders (2013), 
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training includes the basic training phase where recruits are immersed in military culture 
and values and are taught the core skills required by their service component (i.e. Army, 
Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps).  After completing basic training, recruits begin 
specialized or advanced training which provides them with a specific area of expertise or 
concentration.  In the Army and Marine Corps, this area is called a military occupational 
specialty; in the Navy it is known as a rate; and in the Air Force it is simply called an Air 
Force specialty (Enlisted Leaders, 2013). 
Noncommissioned Officer/Petty Officer 
Enlisted members in the Armed Forces are members of the Profession of Arms 
and have taken an oath of enlistment to support and defend the Constitution.  The NCO/ 
PO is known as “the backbone” of the Armed Forces and are empowered and trusted to 
lead today’s all-volunteer force.  NCOs/POs are leaders and technical experts who 
enhance organizational effectiveness and directly contribute to mission success.  
NCOs/POs are responsible and accountable for the development and welfare of their 
subordinates.  They teach, coach and mentor them as well as enforce military standards.  




Figure 3. DoD appropriated funds civilians. This pie chart represents the distribution of 
APF civilian personnel working for the DoD.  There are 740,757 (21%) APF civilian 
personnel in the total DoD workforce.  The largest percentage are employed by the Army 
(34.6%) while the smallest are employed by the Marine Corps (2.5%), DMDC DoD APF 






Figure 4. DoD non-appropriated funds civilians. This pie chart represents the distribution 
of NAF civilian personnel.  There are 124.262 (3.5%) NAF DoD civilians in the total 
DoD workforce.  The largest percentage are working for the Navy (26.3%) while the 
remainder (0.6%) work within other areas of DoD, DMDC DoD NAF civilian file, 2015. 
Department of Defense Civilian 
DoD civilians are federal employees directly hired and paid from appropriated or 
nonappropriated funds, under permanent or temporary appointment.  Many DoD civilians 
are former members of the military (i.e. veterans or retirees) while others are hired as 
interns or due to skills obtained from private sector employment.  DoD civilians have 
three levels of employment:  entry level; mid-career level; and executive level.   
Entry level employees fill positions typically suited for those graduation from 
college with little or no work experience.  DoD select the best and brightest to be part of 
the team, by creating a stimulating corporate culture of openness, integrity, and creativity.  
DoD entry level employees participate in an exceptional environment that provides 
growth, recognition, and continuous learning.  DoD invest in its employees because they 
want to attract and retain the very best. 
Mid-career level employees are creative, team-oriented colleagues who bring 
intensity and integrity, intellectual curiosity and leadership potential to the team.  Most 
veterans and retirees fall in the mid-career level category.  Mid-career employees possess 
extensive experience and are technically competent in one or more areas.  The 
developmental focus of mid-career level employees is team building, interpersonal skills, 
and program management.   
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Executive level employees are executives and managers who lead and motivate 
people, who are results-driven and achieve those results through partnerships and 
building coalitions, and who have a keen business sense about using their resources to get 
the best results possible.  Executive level employees are exceptional leaders with the 
ability to design and implement strategies that maximize employee potential and foster 
high ethical standards that will enable DoD to serve the American people effectively.  
Individuals at this level are developed through broad-based assignments requiring staff 
contacts with top management, officials within DoD, outside agencies, and industry. 
Overall, DoD employees at all levels benefit from a competitive salary and 
benefit package, annual salary increases for satisfactory performance, job security, 
responsibility, challenging work and a valuable retirement plan. 
Defense Contractor 
DoD relies on the private sector to carry out specific aspects of the department’s 
mission.  Critical reliance on contractor support is crucial for the DoD because the federal 
government wants to receive the best value for the warfighter at the tax payer’s expense.  
Furthermore, the contractor is response for carrying out its obligations under the contract 
in terms of quality, timeliness, and cost.  Although defense contractors are an important 
component of the total DoD force, they are not federal government employees.   
Insider threats pose a threat to national security inside and outside of the United 
States (U.S.).  Although it is often difficult to detect and deter insider threats, the DoD 
has developed polices mandating security education, training, and awareness programs as 
a means to mitigate and thwart insider threats.  In September 2014, the DoD insider threat 
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policy required each military component (i.e. Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy) 
to issue respective policies and plans.  As a result, according to the Defense Security 
Service, a sub-agency of the DoD, an insider threat poses a risk by using his/her access to 
classified information to do harm to the United States through acts of espionage, 
terrorism, unauthorized disclosure of national security information (Defense Security 
Services Regulation 05-06, 2014).  
Department of Defense Policies 
DoD Directive 5205.16, The DoD Insider Threat Program, August 28, 2017, 
establishes policy and assigns responsibilities within the DoD to develop and maintain an 
insider threat program to comply with the requirements and minimum standards to 
prevent, deter, detect, and mitigate the threat insiders may pose to the DoD and U.S. 
government installations, facilities, personnel, missions, or resources.  The DoD 
Directive 5205.16 identifies appropriate security training, education, and awareness 
initiatives that may be made available to DoD personnel (i.e. military and DoD civilians) 
and defense contractors.  DoD Directive 5205.16 policy implements the National Insider 
Threat Policy and Minimum Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs by 
gathering, integrating, reviewing, assessing and responding to information derived from 
sources (i.e. security, cybersecurity, counterintelligence, workplace violence, etc.) as 
necessary and appropriate to identify, mitigate, and counter insider threats (DoD, 2017b). 
DoD Instruction 3305.13, DoD Security Education, Training and Certification, 
February 13, 2014, establishes policy, standards, and procedures and assigned 
responsibilities for conduct of DoD security education, training and professional 
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development.  DoD Instruction 3305.13 (2014) ensures DoD develop and maintain 
security education, training and certification programs that are technically sound and 
support DoD missions.   
DoD Instruction 5205.83, DoD Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center 
(DITMAC), March 30, 2017, establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes 
procedures for the DITMAC.  The DITMAC serves as the DoD’s enterprise-level 
capability for insider threat information integration, and management by managing and 
analyzing insider threat information across law enforcement, personnel security, human 
resources, counterintelligence, physical security, network behavior monitoring, and 
cybersecurity activities of all military services pursuant to Executive Order 13587.  
DITMAC policy is in accordance with Executive Order 13587 and DoD Directive 
5205.16 by integrating and centrally analyzing key threat-related information that insider 
threats pose to DoD and U.S. government installations, facilities, personnel, missions, or 
resources (DoD Instruction 5205.83, 2017).  This includes damage to the U.S. through 
espionage, terrorism, unauthorized disclosure of national security information, or through 
the loss or degradation of departmental resources or capabilities (DoD Instruction 
5205.83, 2017).   
DoD Manual 3115.11, DoD Intelligence and Security Training Standards, revised 
on September 8, 2016, provides validated learning requirements to the DoD intelligence 
and security communities learning functions.  DoD’s intelligence and security training 
management functions validate learning requirements by participating in gap analysis, 
coordinating with DoD functional managers and their respective training councils, and 
40 
 
validating learning requirements.  After the requirements are validated, the intelligence 
and security training management functions translate requirements into action plans, 
coordinate with existing learning assets to identify shared resources and services and 
allocate resources to develop learning solutions.  Additionally, the DoD intelligence and 
security training functions support the development and delivery of learning to 
intelligence and security schoolhouses and DoD component training assets. 
Security Education, Training, and Awareness Programs 
Mandatory security education, training, and awareness programs are key to 
mitigating and thwarting insider threats and provides a means to reinforce the need for 
heightened security awareness (DoD, 1999).  Therefore, DoD must establish 
security/counterintelligence related education and training awareness programs to prevent 
incidents like the shootings at Fort Hood, Texas and the Washington Naval Yard.  
Additionally, security education, training, and awareness programs should primarily 
focus on identifying and reporting “insiders” possessing characteristics based on the 
definition of an insider threat. 
DoD Directive 5205.16, The DoD Insider Threat Program designates the Defense 
Security Service as the office for providing insider threat security education, training, and 
awareness programs to DoD components (i.e. Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy) 
and vetted DoD contractors (DoD, 2017b).  DoD component heads are responsible for 
incorporating annual insider threat security education, training and awareness programs 
in accordance with DoD Directive 5240.06, Counterintelligence Awareness and 
Reporting, (DoD, 2017a) and DoD Directive 5240.02, Counterintelligence (DoD, 2015b).   
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Kim & Homan (2012) measured the effectiveness of information security training 
by comparing CBT and IBT.  The study asked 212 Federal government employees to 
choose either CBT or IBT.  A pre-test knowledge quiz was administered prior to the 
training sessions.  After the training sessions were complete, a 60-day and 90-day post-
test knowledge quiz was completed by participants.  The pre-test and post-test results of 
this study implied that an organization must repeatedly provide reminders of training 
materials in order for training to have a lasting effect.  Although CBT programs are 
becoming more common in government and private organizations, the results of Kim & 
Homan’s (2012) study showed that IBT programs are just as effective as CBT programs 
in raising the level of security awareness.  Therefore, the DoD’s use of both CBT and 
IBT programs are very effective in providing insider threat security education, training 
and awareness programs.            
In addition to security education, training and awareness programs, the U.S. 
Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Group based at Fort Meade, Maryland developed an insider 
threat model intended for U.S. Army personnel to act and report suspicious terrorist 
threats (Baker, 2012).  The model divides the observables indicators into three categories 
and attempts to differentiate between the high-risk individual and the terrorist insider 




Category I Indicators 
 Complains about other nations or religions 
 Advocates violence beyond what is the 
accepted norm 
 Abrupt behavioral shift 
 Desires control 
 Socially withdraws in some occasions 
 Appears frustrated with partnered nations 
 Experiences personal crisis 
 Demonizes others 
 Lacks positive identity with unit or country 
 Reclusive 
 Strange Habits 
 Peculiar Discussions 
Category II Indicators 
 Verbally defends radical groups and/or 
ideologies 
 Speaks about seeking revenge 
 Associates with person that have 
extremist beliefs 
 Exhibits intolerance 
 Personally connected to a grievance 
 Cuts ties with unit, family, or friends 
 Isolates self from unit members 
 Intense ideological rhetoric 
 Attempts to recruit others 
 Choice of questionable reading material 
sin personal areas 
Category III Indicators 
 Advocates violence as a solution to problems 
 Shows a sudden shift from “upset” to normal 
 Takes suspicious travel or unauthorized absences 
 Stores or collects ammunition or other items that could be used to injure or kill multiple 
personnel 
 Verbal hatred of partner nation or individual from partner nation 
 Exhibits sudden interest in partner nation headquarters or individual living quarters 
 Makes threatening gestures or verbal threats 
Figure 5. Asymmetric warfare group observable indicators of insider threats. This model 
has 29 observables and appears more extensive than any other model better allowing for 
prevention of insider threat.  From “Insider Threats in Partnering Environments, A Guide 
for Military Leaders”, by Asymmetric Warfare Group, 2011. 
Protecting Classified Information and Systems 
Recent disclosures of classified information and documents by insider threats 
have been disconcerting for the DoD.  As a result, Defense Security Service established 
an insider threat identification and mitigation policy and procedures to identify, deter and 
detect insiders who pose a risk to operations or classified information and systems 
(Defense Security Services Regulation, 2014).   
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Presidential Executive Order 13587 directed all government agencies to include 
six minimum standards into their insider threat programs.  Executive Order 13587 also 
directed reforms on how DoD personnel (military, civilians, and contractors) share and 
safeguard classified information on computer networks.  Although Executive Order 
13587 was enacted to improve the security of classified information, it also included a 
provision to prohibit its use for identifying or preventing whistleblowers from making 
lawful disclosures.   
On January 6, 2016, 22 human and civil rights, whistleblower protection and 
advocacy, lobbying, and free speech and freedom of the press organizations wrote a letter 
to the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, Charles McCullough, III, 
explaining the important role that whistleblowers play in the proper functioning of the 
federal government.  The letter revealed how internal training conducted by the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence mischaracterized whistleblower Thomas Drake as an 
“insider threat’ placing him in the same category as Nidal Hasan and Aaron Alexis.   
According to the Government Accountability Project, Thomas Drake experienced 
retaliation and reprisal after reporting a mass amount of waste and abuse in the billions of 
dollars spent on Operation Steller Wind to his superiors at the National Security Agency, 
Congress and the DoD Inspector General.  In April 2010, the Department of Justice 
indicted Drake under the Espionage Act of 1917 with improper retention of allegedly 
classified information.  Department of Justice charged Drake under 10 separate counts, 
but he only faced five charges under the Espionage Act of 1917.  Eventually, Department 
of Justice’s case against Drake collapsed and the Department of Justice dropped the ten-
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count felony indictment including the espionage charges.  Drake pled guilty to a 
misdemeanor, “exceeding authorized use of a computer” and was sentenced to one year 
of probation and community service thanks to the efforts of the media and Government 
Accountability Project.  Unfortunately, this is not the first time Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence erroneously mischaracterized insider threats and whistleblowers.  
Therefore, government agencies must understand that section 7(e) of Executive Order 
13587 directs government agencies not to seek to deter, detect, or mitigate disclosures of 
information by government employees or contractors that are lawful under and protected 
by the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, Whistleblower 
Protection Act of 1989, Inspector General Act of 1978, or similar statutes, regulations, or 
policies (Obama, 2011).   
Executive Order 13587 has been supported and criticized by Congressional 
lawmakers as well as the general public.  Several Congressional lawmakers supported 
Executive Order 13587 as another weapon against cyber-attacks, while others say it will 
not solve America’s cyber problems (Harmon, 2015).  For example, California 
Representative Adam Schiff praised President Obama’s efforts to secure public and 
private networks from cyber-attacks and espionage, while Speaker of the House John 
Boehner urged President Obama to work with Republicans in Congress to create an 
information-sharing bill instead of imposing an Executive Order   
The DoD structured its insider threat program to address insider threats based on 
Executive Order 13587.  As a result, DoD’s program includes four broad types of insider 
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threats:  Antiterrorism/Force Protection, Cybersecurity, Information Security, and 
Counter Intelligence. (Kirschbaum, 2015).   
Antiterrorism/Force Protection 
The incidents at Fort Hood, Texas in 2009 and the Washington Navy Yard in 
2013 forced DoD to review its Antiterrorism/Force Protection efforts when addressing 
insider threats (Kirschbaum, 2015).  The U.S. Army’s online annual Antiterrorism/Force 
Protection training (i.e. Army Regulation 381-12, Military Intelligence TARP) and 
curriculum on the Joint Knowledge Online website recommended a process to identify 
insider threats based on high-risk behaviors and level of threat activity (Baker, 2012).   
It is important for personnel to participate in threat awareness training and 
education because the DoD is a prime target for exploitation by foreign intelligence and 
international terrorist organizations and from insider threats.  Protecting the lives of 
troops depends on knowledge, awareness, and participation in threat awareness and 
reporting.  It is essential to increase security education, training, and awareness programs 
in order to inform insiders of their responsibilities, to reduce carelessness and to inform 
the potential insider threat of the consequences of such behavior (DoD, 1999).  Therefore, 
security education, training, and awareness programs play an important role in protecting 
the lives of troops as well as protecting national security at home and abroad.  For 
example, Army Regulation 381-12 states that all Department of the Army personnel will 
receive TARP training within 30 days of assignment or employment to an organization 
followed by mandatory annual TARP training in a live environment conducted by a 
qualified counterintelligence agent.  Department of the Army defined a qualified 
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counterintelligence agent as those who have successfully completed the TARP T3 
program (Army Regulation, 381-12, 2016).  TARP formerly known as Subversion and 
Espionage Directed Against the United States, establishes policy and responsibilities for 
threat awareness and reporting in the U.S. Army.     
Army Regulation 381-12, TARP, outlines the U.S. Army’s primary method of 
educating the force about insider threats.  Army Regulation 381-12 provides policy and 
responsibilities for threat awareness and education and establishes a requirement for 
Department of the Army personnel to report any incident of known or suspected 
espionage, international terrorism, sabotage, subversion, theft or diversion of military 
technology, information systems intrusions, and unauthorized disclosure of classified 
information (Deming, 2017).  Military personnel who fail to report insider threats are 
subject to punishment under Uniform Code of Military Justice as well as to adverse 
administrative or other adverse action authorized by provisions of the U.S. Code or 
Federal Regulations.  Civilian personnel and contractors are subject to adverse 
administrative actions or criminal prosecution as authorized by applicable provisions of 
U.S. Code or Federal Regulations.  Failure to educate personnel to report insider threats 
leads to loss of life as in the cases of Army Sergeant William Kreutzer, Jr. at Fort Bragg, 
North Carolina.    
Sergeant Kreutzer exhibited signs of extreme behavior in which he wanted to kill 
fellow soldiers for teasing and disrespecting him.  Sergeant Kreutzer’s mental health 
continued to deteriorate due to personal and professional issues.  He was teased and 
called nicknames by fellow soldiers which frustrated him to the point where he wanted to 
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shoot and kill members of his team.  Unfortunately, on October 27, 1995 Sergeant 
Kreutzer armed with two semi-automatic rifles, two pistols, a knife, and nearly 900 
rounds of ammunition methodically wounded eight soldiers and killed one while 2nd 
Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division prepared for a brigade run (Deming, 2017).  This attack 
by an insider threat was preventable, but fellow soldiers failed to report Kreutzer’s 
behavior to leadership and leaders failed to acknowledge him as a threat and discharge 
him from military service.   
Cybersecurity 
In 2015, the GAO released a report on widespread cybersecurity weaknesses at 
most federal agencies making DoD uniquely susceptible to cybersecurity data breeches 
(Rotenberg, Gartland, Lipsitz, & Moscardini, 2016).  Federal agency computer systems 
face an evolving array of cyber-based threats that are unintentional and intentional.  
Unintentional threats range from software coding errors to the actions of careless or 
poorly trained employees.  Whereas intentional threats are targeted or untargeted attacks 
from criminals, hackers, adversarial nations, terrorist, disgruntled employees or other 
organizational insiders (Willemssen, et. al., 2015).  Over the last several years, federal 
agencies expressed their concerns regarding recent incidents involving breeches of 
sensitive data.  Figure 5 below depicts the sharp increase in information security incidents 





Figure 6. Incidents reported to the U.S. computer emergency readiness team by federal 
agencies, fiscal years 2006 through 2014.GAO analysis of United States Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team data for fiscal years 2006-2014, GAO-15-194T, 2015. 
In 2016, DoD decided to take a proactive measure by planning to build a database 
to monitor, analyze and identify insider threats in accordance with Executive Order 
13587.  DoD’s database, officially titled Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center 
and DoD Component Insider Threat Records System, provides a non-exhaustive list of 
insider threats including those causing damage to the U.S. through espionage, terrorism, 
unauthorized disclosure of national security information, or through the loss or 
degradation of departmental resources or capabilities (Gartland, Lipsitz, & Moscardini, 
2016).   
In another research study, cybersecurity expert, Dr. Eric A. Cole, analyzed data 
based on studies conducted by CERT and the U.S. Secret Service and determined that 
profiled insiders often displayed warning signs prior to their actions against an 
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organization.  According to Cole (2012), 80% of insiders who launched attacks against 
their organizations had displayed negative behaviors prior to the incident; 92% 
experienced a negative work-related event (e.g. demotion, transfer, or termination); and 
59% were former employees or contractors (Cole, 2012).   
Mills, et. al., (2011) scenario-based approach to mitigating insider threats 
analyzed insider threats in multiple layers starting with personal interactions or 
observables layered with informational auditing of cyber actions.  The scenario-based 
approach gives the organization the ability to identify its critical information resources by 
using these resources to work through scenarios to pinpoint possible insider attacks.  
Using this approach helps the organization develop the necessary adjustment or 
validations needed for their defense systems (Baker, 2012). 
In an effort to mitigate and thwart insider threats, Executive Order 13587 ordered 
federal agencies to create insider threat detection and prevention programs.  Executive 
Order 13587 also requires federal agencies to ensure responsible sharing and 
safeguarding of classified information on computer networks that shall be consistent with 
appropriate protections for privacy and civil liberties (Rotenberg, Gartland, Lipsitz, & 
Moscardini, 2016).      
Information Security 
Three independent inquiries were commissioned by the DoD, FBI, and U.S. 
Senate after Army Major Nidal Hasan opened fire at the Soldier Readiness Center at Fort 
Hood, Texas on November 5, 2009 killing 13 soldiers and injuring 43 (Aradau & Blanke, 
2017).  The DoD, FBI, and U.S. Senate debated whether or not Hasan’s motives were a 
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case of terrorism, an instance of violent Islamic extremism, or simple workplace violence 
(Baker, 2012).  However, public debate evolved around whether digital technologies and 
information would have provided better information sharing among the DoD, FBI, and 
U.S. Senate.  While the FBI’s inquiry highlighted ‘the ever-increasing challenge that 
electronic communications pose to identify and avert potentially destructive activity’, the 
U.S. Senate inquiry looked for clues the FBI had available buy missed given that it 
lacked the totality of the information or failed to ‘connect the dots’.  Unfortunately, in the 
wake of the Fort Hood, Texas attack the use of the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) Anomaly Detection at Multiple Scales (ADAMS) software went 
largely unnoticed.  Since the Fort Hood, Texas shooting, anomaly detection software has 
emerged as a key area of security professionals by showing the promise of Big Data to 
capture the ‘unknown of unknowns’ and departing from the digital techniques that 
concentrate on analyzing known suspects or profiling risky individuals such as Edward 
Snowden (Aradau & Blanke, 2017).   
Accelerating growth of the Internet and development of information technology 
have brought a rapid increase in the use of open and shared network systems.  These 
network systems improve the ability to provide DoD organizations with access to data 
and make them vulnerable to service interruptions, theft, or altercation of data (Kim & 
Homan, 2012).  Insider threats exploit information security by exposing radical views 
using computers and the Internet (Baker, 2012).  In order to thwart an insider threat’s 
exploitation of DoD’s information systems, other processes must be developed to oversee 
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human monitoring.  Therefore, DARPA created a new detection software to assist DoD 
with mitigating and thwarting an insider threat’s exploitation of information systems.   
DARPA uses ADAMS software to develop a set of algorithms which detects 
anomalous behavior before damage is done.  ADAMS’ software-based approach tracks a 
person’s online work activity in an effort to detect anomalous behavior.  In order for the 
data to be useful in thwarting and mitigating insider threats it must contain detailed 
accounts of human behavior within a monitored environment.  Once the data is collected, 
ADAMS analyzes it and highlights the potential threats.  Using DARPA’s ADAMS 
software-based approach is DoD’s best defense against exploitation of insider threats 
because it protects DoD’s information systems from breeches caused by insider threats.   
In the months following the WikiLeaks revelations, DARPA put out requests for 
research on methods to detect suspicious behavior in large datasets to root out rogue 
actors like Manning and Hasan (Keating, 2013).  ADAMS was one of the most ambitious 
programs meant to create, adapt and apply technology to the problem of anomaly 
characterization and detection in massive datasets and would develop computers that 
could analyze a large set of user-generated data 
Unfortunately, there is a downside to collecting real data for research using the 
DARPA’s ADAMS software-based approach because of ethical, legal, confidentiality, 
and privacy concerns.  Therefore, proxy data sets and synthetic data were used for the 
ADAMS software-based approach for research purposes.  Glasser & Lindauer’s (2013) 
research generated synthetic data to simulate the aggregated collection of logs from host-
based distributed across all computer workstations within a large business or government 
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organization over a 500-day period.  Using synthetic data can control and rapidly and 
economically generate data sets with desired characteristics, size, and quality relative to 
measurable characteristics.  The data sets are fully intact and free of privacy restrictions 
or limitations (Glasser & Lindauer, 2013).     
Counterintelligence 
Lone wolf actors are often successful at insider threat attacks.  For example, U.S. 
Army Medical Command leadership failed to reprimand Army Major Nidal Hasan for his 
actions prior to the 2009 Fort Hood, Texas shooting (Baker, 2012).  Hasan’s chain of 
command at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences had identified 
him, as early as 2007, as unprofessional and possessing radical beliefs. Hasan was also 
referred to the FBI for possible terrorist activity.  Although, the FBI confirmed Hasan’s 
activity, they determined it had been for research purposes for his Master in Public 
Health degree.  Globalization, rapid technological advancements, and uncertain fiscal 
environment present new avenues of collection and threats from foreign intelligence 
services and entities that target U.S. national security, information systems, and 
personnel.  Insider threats are often lured to commit acts of espionage by exploiting their 
access to compromise vast amounts of sensitive and classified information as part of 
personal ideology or at the direction of foreign intelligence entities.  Treacherous acts 
such as illegally released information by WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden highlight a 
link between counterintelligence and the need to identify and report insider threats before 
they cause grave risk to national security and put lives at risk (Committee on Homeland 
Security House of Representatives One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, 2016).  These 
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unauthorized disclosures continue to pose a critical threat to national security (Flynn, 
2014).   
Counterintelligence operations are also used in criminal investigations due to the 
goal of seeking out suspects who have committed national security crimes such as 
espionage, sedition, or terrorism (Stockham, 2017).  Therefore, DoD must also ensure 
each military service law enforcement capabilities are incorporated into its 
counterintelligence operations.     
Although nearly 140 nations and some 35 known suspected terrorist organizations 
currently target the U.S. for intelligence collection, the number of potential insider threats 
waiting to strike or steal classified information brings the threats even higher (Stockham, 
2017).  These insiders work on behalf of foreign adversaries or as lone wolves.  When 
there is a critical risk to national security (i.e. Manning and Snowden), DoD conducts 
aggressive and comprehensive counterintelligence investigations that are intended to 
detect, identify, exploit, and neutralize the foreign intelligence entities and insider threat 
to the DoD (Stockham, 2017).   
President Obama’s 2016 National Counterintelligence Strategy characterized the 
counterintelligence threat as “daunting” and one that “seeks to undermine our economic 
strength, steal our most sensitive information, and weaken out defenses” (Committee on 
Homeland Security House of Representatives One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, 2016, 
p. 12).  Furthermore, DoD places great emphasis on its counterintelligence operations 
through intelligence collection and analysis by military intelligence commands (i.e. 
Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Security Service, etc.).  Acting on collected 
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information based on counterintelligence operations is DoD’s best defense in thwarting 
and mitigating insider threats.  Therefore, it is important to establish effective 
counterintelligence efforts. 
Policy and Strategic Initiatives 
In an effort to mitigate insider threats, the Senior Civilian Official (SCO) of the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and 
Intelligence) OASD (C3I) established the Insider Threat Integrated Process Team.  The 
Insider Threat Integrated Process Team recommended ten policy and strategic initiatives 
to thwart insider threats within the DoD.  Incorporating effective security education, 
training, and awareness programs is one of the policies and strategic initiatives that must 
be developed to improve how personnel identify and report insider threats in the DoD. 
GAO identified 25 key elements that DoD should incorporate in their insider 
threat programs.  These key elements are based on a GAO analysis of the National 
Insider Threat Policy and Minimum Standards for Executive Agencies, DoD policy and 
guidance, executive-branch policy and reports, and independent studies to mitigate 
insider threats (Kirschbaum, 2015).  Of the 25 key elements, training employees was 
identified and is an integral part of the “Prevent” phase of DoD’s insider threat programs.  
Additionally, Figure 6 depicts the remaining phases (Deter, Detect and Take Action) as 
integral parts of insider threat security education and awareness programs.  
So far DoD have inconsistently incorporated the following key elements (a) 
institute and communicate consequences (b) develop a baseline of normal activity (c) 
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share information as appropriate and (d) develop, disseminate and incorporate best 





Figure 7. Government Accountability Office’s framework of key elements to incorporate 
at each phase of Department of Defense’s insider-threat programs.GAO analysis of 





The DoD must implement these recommendations in order to prevent additional 
insider threat attacks.  The shootings at Fort Hood, TX and the Washington Navy Yard 
could have been prevented if personnel were educated and trained on insider threat 
awareness.  Moreover, managers and military leaders of both individuals involved should 
have been trained to recognize the characteristics of an insider threat.   
In response to the Fort Hood, Texas and Washington Navy Yard shootings, DoD 
must develop effective training programs and train commanders and supervisors on how 
to identify behavioral indicators of violence.  Security education, training, and awareness 
programs should take into account lessons learned from these shootings as well as ensure 
DoD issue interim guidance and provide commanders and supervisors with information 
and tools needed to identify and respond to insider threats.   
A continuing war on terror increases the chance of another insider threat because 
of the possible influence of Al Qaeda and ISIS among disgruntle personnel with access to 
classified documentation and information systems (Shaw & Seller, 2015).  Although 
Hasan was a poor performer and displayed erratic behavior, the investigating officer 
failed to identify signs of radicalization or him as a counterintelligence risk.  According 
to Zegart (2015), DoD’s organizational culture of protecting forces from the outside 
played a role in failing to prevent Hasan from killing 13 people and wounding dozens of 
others.  Despite a rising number of homegrown Jihadi terrorist attacks DoD continues to 
struggle to adapt to insider threats.  Therefore, insider threats like Aaron Alexis, Army 
Private Bradley Manning, and Army Major Nidal Hasan were prepared to commit hostile 
acts of violence against DoD personnel and information system (Shaw & Seller, 2015).   
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Summary and Conclusions 
This quantitative research study focuses on the effectiveness of insider threat 
security education, training, and awareness programs within the DoD.  Although 
Presidential Executive Order 13587 directs the DoD and government agencies to 
establish insider threat programs based on six minimum standards, the literature identifies 
several flaws in the system ranging from a lack of effective security education, training, 
and awareness programs to creating unified databases to track information needed to 
thwart future insider threat attacks.  
 Overall, the literature review discussed security education, training and 
awareness programs, protecting classified information and systems and the 
implementation of policies and strategic initiatives as means to thwart and mitigate 
insider threats within the DoD.  The use of strategic policies based on the military’s 
intelligence preparation of the battlefield and successfully incorporating organizational 
culture and change can help DoD leaders understand the importance of mitigating and 
thwarting insider threats.   
The use of current policies and regulations based on recommendations from 
several investigations conducted by the DoD, FBI and Congress provided the DoD with 
the necessary tools and resources needed not only to improve but develop better training 
programs designed to identify and report insider threats.  Despite all of the lessons 
learned from insider threat attacks, DoD leaders must emphasize the importance of 
identifying and reporting as well as provide better monitoring and information sharing 
between each military service and government intelligence and law enforcement 
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agencies.  Additionally, DoD should consider providing both IBT and CBT as methods of 
delivering insider threat security education, training and awareness programs.   
Chapter 3 will discuss the methodology and threats to validity of this quantitative 
research study.  The methodology section will explain the use of use of sampling 
procedures based on a target population size to conduct a quantitative research analysis 
based on two research questions and hypotheses mentioned in Chapter 1.  Moreover, the 
quantitative non-experimental research study will focus on the statistical relationship 
between two variables as a means of deciding whether or not the effectiveness of insider 
threat security awareness training in relation to military and civilian personnel 
understanding how to identify and report insider threats.  The section on threats to 
validity will describe both the external and internal validity and explain how they will be 





Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
For the DoD to mitigate insider threats, personnel must obtain knowledge on 
insider threat behaviors and characteristics through DoD developed security education, 
training, and awareness programs.  According to the National Insider Threat Policy and 
Minimum Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs, which is authorized 
by Presidential Executive Order 13587, either in-person or CBT to all cleared employees 
must be conducted within 30 days of initial employment and annually thereafter (DoD 
Directive 5240.02; DoD, 2015b).  Despite the initial and annual training requirement, the 
DoD identified 87% of insider threats as employees or others internal to the organization 
(i.e., defense contractors working onsite) who contemplate to divulge classified 
information (Greitzer & Hohimer, 2011).  Additionally, the DoD has not identified a 
method or system to measure the effectiveness of security education, training, and 
awareness programs designed to ensure everyone understands the importance of 
identifying and reporting insider threats within their organizations.  Therefore, the 
purpose of this study was to understand the perceived effectiveness of security education, 
training and awareness programs provided to DoD personnel.   
Chapter 3 is divided into three sections: research design and rationale, 
methodology, and threats to validity.  The Research Design and Rationale section will 
state the independent, dependent, and controlling and intervening variables; identify 
research design and its connection to the research questions; explain time and resource 
constraints; and describe how design choice is consistent with the research design.  The 
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Methodology section will provide an in-depth description of the research so other 
researchers can replicate the study.  This section is subdivided into the following: 
population; sampling and sampling procedures; procedures for recruitment, participation, 
and data collection; and instrumentation and operationalization of constructs.  And 
finally, the Threats to Validity section will describe threats to external validity and how 
they were addressed; describe threats to internal validity and how they were addressed; 
describe any threats to construct or statistical conclusion validity; and describe the ethical 
procedures. 
Research Design and Rationale 
Research design is the defining element of a survey in which the survey results 
are used to describe the variables being studied (Gravetter & Forzano, 2018).  For this 
study, the research design was quantitative and nonexperimental focused on a limited 
number of independent and dependent variables.  The independent variables were DoD 
programs (CBT and IBT) designed to mitigate insider threats by changing attitudes, 
improving knowledge, or increasing skills in identifying an insider threat.  The dependent 
variables were known acts of espionage, unauthorized disclosure of information, and any 
activity resulting in the intentional or unintentional loss of organizational resources 
and/or capabilities from the actions of an insider.  Control and intervening variables were 
gender (i.e., male or female) and military and civilian status (e.g., officer, 
noncommissioned officer, enlisted, DoD civilian, and contractor).  The quantitative 
nonexperimental research design allowed for testing all hypotheses and correlates with 
the following research questions:   
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RQ1: What is the perceived effectiveness of CBT and IBT programs in mitigating 
and thwarting insider threats within the DoD?   
RQ2: What is the perceived effectiveness of CBT and IBT programs in preventing 
known acts of espionage, unauthorized disclosure, or loss of organizational resources?   
A nonexperimental research study is focused on a statistical relationship between 
two variables and does not include the manipulation of the independent variable, nor does 
it randomly assign participants to conditions or orders of conditions or both (Price, 
Jhangiani, & Chiang, 2015).  The variables in this study were not be manipulated because 
they are attribute variables such as gender, military rank, DoD civilian status, or 
contractor.  These attributes are reflected in the effectiveness of insider threat security 
awareness training in relation to military and civilian personnel understanding how to 
identify and report an insider threat.  Additionally, understanding the effects of the DoD 
organizational culture and change can help leadership mitigate insider threats from their 
organization.   
Methodology 
Population 
Sampling was necessary in this study because it is not possible to collect data for 
every individual in the population involving the DoD.  The greater the sample size, the 
more representative is expected to be of the population from which it is drawn (Ary, et. 
al., 2018).  The DoD is the world’s largest employer with over 3 million employees 
located around the world.  The target population and sample size consisted of DoD 
personnel (active, Reserve, and National Guard soldiers, civilians, and contractors) who 
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live and work in the United States and have been employed by the federal government for 
at least 5 years.   
Sampling and Sampling Procedures 
The intent of sampling in a quantitative design is to estimate or predict the 
outcome of a larger population based on data from a sample of that population 
(Schofield, 2004).  In quantitative research studies, sample accuracy represents the larger 
population and is more important than sample size, as factors that may bias the outcome 
of the study need to be controlled or excluded (Endacott & Botti, 2005).  Hence, 
identifying the specific characteristics of the target population is the first step in 
sampling.  The next step in the sampling process is to define the inclusion and exclusion 
criteria of the accessible population.  Inclusion criteria are based on the research 
questions and the research plan and are applied to improve the feasibility of conducting 
the study.  The inclusion criteria for this study are individuals who (a) are current 
employees of the DoD, (b) have been employed by the DoD for 5 or more years, and (c) 
completed all of the mandatory annual security training (i.e., Operations Security, Insider 
Threat, and TARP training).  In contrast, exclusion criteria are applied to exclude unique 
characteristics that may misperceive the results or deal with ethical considerations related 
to the study.  Exclusion criteria for this study included individuals who have been 
employed by the DoD for fewer than 5 years (i.e., interns, military members in the ranks 
of E1-E4 and O1-O3).    
A quota sample was used to address the research questions and hypotheses based 
on the independent and dependent variables.  The quota sample involved existing 
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participants to recruit future participants from the overall population of the DoD.  
Nonprobability sample designs such as snowball sampling technique, convenience, 
purposive, and stratified sampling strategy were not designed to answer the research 
questions for this study.  Additionally, the remaining probability sample designs (simple 
random, systematic, and cluster sampling) were not suitable for selecting a sample for 
this study because the target population would not have an equal chance of being selected 
to participate.   
G*Power statistical power analysis was used to determine sample size.  G*Power 
statistical power analysis is a stand-alone power analysis program used in the social 
behavioral and biomedical sciences to provide both numerical and graphical output 
options (Faul et al., 2018).  Calculating sample size in quantitative research depends on a 
number of factors including research design, sampling method, the degree of precision 
required, the variability of the factors being investigated, and the incidence of a particular 
variable in the population.  In general, the larger the sample the higher the likelihood that 
the findings will reflect the population, resulting in lower sampling error (Endacott & 
Botti, 2005).   
Although there are five types of power analysis in G*Power 3.1.9.2, this study 
involved a priori analysis to compute the sample size as a function of specified values for 
the required significance level α, the desired statistical power 1 – β, and the detected 
population effect size f2.  The sample size was calculated using the G*Power 3.1.9.2 
analysis program and the following input: effect size f2 = 0.0625; α err prob = 0.05; and 
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Power (1-β err prob) = 0.80, resulting in a sample size of 113.  Therefore, 113 
participants from the DoD were needed to conduct the study.   
The following percentages were obtained from the 2015 DoD Demographics 
Report and used to calculate the simple random samples:  24.5% DoD Civilians, 36.8% 
Active Duty forces, and 31.2% Ready Reserve (Reserve and National Guard forces).  The 
remaining percentage of 7.5% Defense contractors brings the total demographics 
percentages to 100%.  Therefore, the simple random sample sizes based on a stratified 
sample size of 113 participants were 28 DoD civilians, 42 Active Duty forces, 35 Ready 
Reserve forces, and eight Defense contractors. 
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
Recruiting participants for data collection could have been a challenge because 
the DoD workforce consists of over 3 million personnel.  Therefore, participant 
recruitment included a subset of the overall DoD workforce population.  Additionally, 
participants (military, civilian, and government contractors) must have completed 
mandatory security awareness training (i.e., Operations Security training, Insider Threat 
training, TARP training, etc.) within fiscal year 2018 and been employed by the DoD or 
defense contractor (contractors only) for 5 or more years.  DoD’s fiscal year is October 
1–September 30. 
After gathering a list of potential participants, individuals were contacted via a 
private message and/or private group invitation.  A final review of the list of participants 
who accept the invitation as compiled.  The participants will receive further details 
regarding the study via private message on the group website setup for this study.  During 
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the recruitment phase of the study, each participant was asked for additional contact 
information (i.e., e-mail, mailing address, etc.) with a limitation on collecting personal 
identifiable information such as social security number, place of birth, mother’s maiden 
name, date of birth, etc.  Although the survey asked a participant’s age, date of birth was 
not be required.  Once the contact information was compiled, reviewed, and documented, 
a detailed letter explaining the study was e-mailed or mailed to each participant.   
Additionally, a letter of cooperation was submitted to a DoD organization 
requesting permission to recruit research participants.  The letter explained the study and 
requested assistance with providing participants for the research study.  Once approval 
from this organization and the institutional review board (IRB) was obtained, a survey 
link was provided to the organization for dissemination to potential participants.   
I planned to collect data for 30 days before closing the study to conduct 
quantitative analysis on the responses.  During data collection, I observed and noted 
baseline descriptive and demographic characteristics of the sample population as well as 
how the population is represented in the sample size.  The debriefing process consisted of 
contacting each participant and the DoD organization thanking them for providing their 
responses to the survey and ensuring them that their identities and responses will be 
protected as well as the results.  The debrief concluded research participation.   
Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs 
The study included a 10-question survey that is aligned to the research questions.  
Table 2 lists the research questions and corresponding survey questions.  A 10-question 
Likert-scale survey was created using the free online survey tool Survey Monkey.  The 
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Likert-scale survey provided the most reliable way to measure research participants’ 
opinions, perceptions, and behaviors.  Likewise, I used Survey Monkey’s suite of paid 
back-end programs, which include data analysis, sample selection, bias elimination, and 
data representation tools to upload data into SPSS Statistics Software.  The advantages to 
using the Likert-scale survey is that makes question answering easy on the respondent, 
represents neutral and undecided feelings of participants, the responses are easy to code 
when accumulating data, and the surveys are quick, inexpensive, and efficient for data 
collection.  The disadvantages to using the Likert-scale survey are that is only gives five 
to seven options to choose from, and it does not measure the true attitudes of the 






Research Survey Questions and Response Options 
Survey Questions Response Options 
1. What is your gender? 
MALE  
FEMALE 
2. What is your status? 
MILITARY 
O1E – O3E 
O1 – O3 
O4 – O6 
O7 – O10 
WO1 – CW2 
CW3 – CW5 
E4 – E6 
E7 – E9 
 
CIVILIAN 
GS7 – GS10 
GS11 – GS13 
GS14 – GS15 
Senior executive service 
CONTRACTOR 
3. How long have you been employed by the DoD or Defense 
Contractor? 
5 -10 Years 
10 -15 Year 
15 – 20 Years 
20 – 25 Years 
25 – 30 Years 
30+ Years 
4. How effective are Computer-based training programs in 






5. How effective are Instructor-based training programs in 
understanding, identifying and reporting insider threats? 
6. How effective are Computer-based training programs in 
identifying and reporting known acts of espionage and 
unauthorized disclosure? 
7. How effective are Instructor-based training programs in 
identifying and reporting known acts of espionage and 
unauthorized disclosure? 
8. How effective are Computer-based training programs in 
comprehending the importance of mitigating and thwarting 
insider threats within the DoD? 
9. How effective are Instructor-based training programs in 
comprehending the importance of mitigating and thwarting 
insider threats within the DoD? 
10. Overall, DoD annual mandatory insider threat security 
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Variables, Measurement, and Analytical Method 
The independent variables will be DoD CBT versus IBT security education, 
training, awareness programs designed to mitigate and thwart insider threats in which 
criterion determines whether or not the effectiveness of security education, training, and 
awareness CBT or IBT programs changes attitudes, improve knowledge or increase skills 
in identifying an insider threat.  The level of measurement will be the Likert-scale and it 
will measure the perceived effectiveness of CBT and IBT programs of insider threat 
security education, training and awareness programs.  The dependent variable will be 
perceived effectiveness.  Control and intervening variables will be gender and military 
and civilian status (e.g., noncommissioned officer, DoD civilian, etc.).   
The following research questions and hypotheses will address the relationships 
between the independent variables and the dependent variables: 
RQ1: What is the perceived effectiveness of CBT and IBT programs in mitigating 
and thwarting insider threats within the DoD? 
H01: There is no statistically significant difference between the perceived 
effectiveness of CBT and IBT programs in mitigating and thwarting insider threats. 
H11: There is a statistically significant difference between the perceived 
effectiveness of CBT and IBT programs in mitigating and thwarting insider threats. 
RQ2: What is the perceived effectiveness of CBT and IBT programs in preventing 
known acts of espionage, unauthorized disclosure, or loss of organizational resources?  
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H02: There is no statistically significant difference between the effectiveness of 
CBT and IBT programs in preventing known acts of espionage, unauthorized disclosure, 
or loss of organizational resources. 
H12: There is a statistically significant difference between the effectiveness of 
CBT and IBT programs in preventing known acts of espionage, unauthorized disclosure, 
or loss of organizational resources. 
The statistical method used in this research study will be Two-Way Multivariate 
Analysis of Variance (MANOVA).  The Two-Way MANOVA will analyze whether or 
not the perceived effectiveness of CBT and IBT programs changes attitudes, improve 
knowledge and increases skills in identifying insider threats among male and female 
military and civilian personnel.     
Threats to Validity 
External Validity Threats 
Drawing incorrect inferences from sample data can introduce external validity 
threats.  There is a possibility of an interaction of selection and treatment due to the 
characteristics of the research study participants.  Therefore, I must restrict generalization 
of the groups of participants identified for this research study by distinguishing the 
characteristics of each group of participants based on the characteristics identified in the 
research study. 
Internal Validity Threats 
Internal validity threats in the form of experimental procedures, treatments, or 
experiences of the participants can interfere with the ability to draw correct inferences 
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form the data about the population in an experiment.  Selection and mortality are two 
forms of internal validity threats that may affect the outcome of this research study.   
Selection poses a risk because each of the selected research participants have 
certain characteristics that may predispose them to a certain outcome.  Participants 
characterized as senior leaders (officers, warrant officers, SES, etc.) are more educated 
and may have a better understanding of the effectiveness of security education, training, 
and awareness programs.  Whereas subordinates (NCOs/POs, civilians in nonsupervisory 
positions, etc.) may not take the training as serious or feel it is a way for senior leaders to 
“check the box” for their annual performance evaluations.  Selecting research study 
participants using the snowball sampling technique works best because research study 
participants can recruit future participants.  Therefore, it is important to ensure all of the 
research study participants equally understand the importance of security education, 
training, and awareness programs when it comes to reporting insider threats. 
Although the sample size may consist of 113 participants, mortality may become 
an issue with this research study because participants may decide to drop out of the 
research study.  Ensuring there are enough participants to conduct the research study can 
reduce the risk of mortality.  Therefore, it is crucial that this research study retain a large 
sample size to minimize the threat of mortality. 
Threats to Statistical Conclusion Validity 
Additional threats to validity in this research study are possible due statistical 
validity.  There is a possibility to draw inaccurate inferences from the data based on the 
violation of statistical assumptions or inaccurate statistical power calculations.  In order 
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minimize the effects of the statistical threats to validity, I must ensure the data and 
statistical power are accurate and that there are no violations in my statistical 
assumptions.   
Ethical Procedures 
It is important that the research study follow appropriate ethical procedures to 
protect the participant’s privacy.  The use of social media as well as a DoD organization 
with military, civilians and contractors will be used as a source for obtaining potential 
research study participants.  I will discuss my research study with my supervisor and ask 
for assistance with obtaining permission to recruit participants because this DoD location 
has the subset or the target population needed to participant in the 10-question research 
study survey.  Additional research participants will be contacted via private messages 
sent using Facebook and Linkedin.  After contacting each individual as well as receiving 
permission from the DoD organization, I will compile a list of potential research study 
participants.  Each research participant contacted via Linkedin and Facebook will receive 
a letter via email or mail explaining the research study and asking for their permission to 
participant in the study.  Research participants from the DoD organization will 
acknowledge their participation in the research study prior to taking the online survey.  
All research study participants will be given an opportunity to opt out or withdraw from 
the study at any time.  Since the research study will draw from a large population, there 
should not be any adverse effects to the research study or its findings.  Additionally, each 
participant will be asked to not disclose or discuss the research study.  This will be 
disclosed in the letter provided to the research study participants.   
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Data will be compiled anonymously and remain confidential throughout the 
collection phase.  I will store data in an encrypted file on a separate external drive and 
stored in a locked drawer in my home office.  I will be the only one with access to the 
research data.  One the research is completed and the dissertation is approved and 
published I will destroy all hard and digital copies of data collected during the research 
study.    
Summary 
The research study will use a large sample size from the DoD to ensure a greater 
representation of the target population.  This includes ensuring the sample size represents 
the larger population by identifying the specific characteristics of the target population 
(i.e. military, civilians, and defense contractors).  Inclusion and exclusion criteria are 
based on the research questions, the research plan, are applied to improve the feasibility 
of conducting the research study and are applied to exclude unique characteristics that 
may misperceive the results or deal with ethical considerations related to the research 
study.   
The G*Power 3.1.9.2 A priori analysis to compute the sample size as 113 which 
corresponds to the approximate sample size of 100-120 participants for the research 
study.  Utilizing social media (e.g. Facebook and Linkedin) as well as a DoD 
organization are great recruitment sources for research participants.  Internal and external 
threats to validity will be addressed by restricting generalizations of groups and by 
reducing the risk associated with selection and mortality.  Whereas threats to statistical 
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conclusion validity will be minimized by the use of accuracy and zero violations in 
statistical assumptions. 
Finally, the research study will follow ethical procedures to ensure each research 
participant’s identity and response remain anonymous and confidential.  Digital Research 
data will be stored in an encrypted data file on an external hard drive and all hard copies 
will be locked inside a desk drawer in my home office.  I will be the only one with access 
to both digital and hard copy files. 
Chapter 4 begins the data collection phase of the research study.  After receiving 
signed letter of permission from each participant and approval from the IRB, I will begin 




Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to understand the effectiveness of the 
security education, training, and awareness programs currently provided to military, 
civilian, and government contractors with access to DoD resources, organizations, and 
facilities.  I compared the effectiveness of CBT and IBT by exploring the relationships 
between the independent variables (DoD CBT and IBT programs designed to mitigate 
insider threats) and the dependent variables (known acts of espionage, unauthorized 
disclosure of information, and any activity resulting in the intentional or unintentional 
loss of organizational resources and/or capabilities from the actions of an insider).  
Control and intervening variables were gender and military and civilian status (e.g., 
noncommissioned officer, DoD civilian, etc.).  Testing these variables helped answer the 
following research questions: 
RQ1: What is the perceived effectiveness of CBT and IBT programs in mitigating 
and thwarting insider threats within the DoD? 
H01: There is no statistically significant difference between the perceived 
effectiveness of CBT and IBT programs in mitigating and thwarting insider threats. 
H11: There is a statistically significant difference between the perceived 
effectiveness of CBT and IBT programs in mitigating and thwarting insider threats. 
RQ2: What is the perceived effectiveness of CBT and IBT programs in preventing 
known acts of espionage, unauthorized disclosure, or loss of organizational resources?  
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H02: There is no statistically significant difference between the effectiveness of 
CBT and IBT programs in preventing known acts of espionage, unauthorized disclosure, 
or loss of organizational resources. 
H12: There is a statistically significant difference between the effectiveness of 
CBT and IBT programs in preventing known acts of espionage, unauthorized disclosure, 
or loss of organizational resources. 
The DoD workforce consists of over 3 million personnel, making recruitment and 
data collection a challenge.  Although I did not have any issues obtaining approval from a 
DoD organization to recruit personnel, it was difficult contacting the DoD IRB approval 
authority as well as obtaining approval to collect data from DoD personnel for my study.  
After finding the DoD IRB approval authority, I had to obtain IRB approval from Walden 
University prior to requesting DoD IRB approval to collect data.  As a stipulation to 
receiving DoD IRB approval, I agreed to limit my data collection to 100 participants, 
though the stratified sample size for my research survey was 113.   
Data Collection 
Participants were recruited from a sample size of the DoD population of 3 million 
personnel via a private Facebook Group and a DoD organization.  Although the sample 
size in Chapter 3 was based on a stratified sample size of 113 participants, I was able to 
recruit 42 research study participants.  Forty-two research study participants answered the 
10-question Likert-scale survey over a 3-week period from December 10–24, 2019 at a 
response rate of 1.47 seconds per question.  Participants were not required to provide 
additional contact information (i.e., e-mail, mailing address, etc.), nor were they asked to 
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provide demographics such as age.  However, 100% of the participants provided gender, 
employment status (military, civilian, or defense contractor), and length of employment 
with the DoD or defense contractor.  Five years or more of employment with the DoD or 
a defense contractor was a criterion for participating in the study. 
During the data analysis, I observed and noted baseline descriptive and 
demographic characteristics of the sample population.  The first three survey questions 
related to demographics and resulted data related to participants’ gender, pay grade, and 
years of employment.  Most participants were female (55%), and most were employed 
for either 5-10 years (29%) or 10-15 years (26%).  Finally, most were GS11-GS13 pay 
grade (76%).  Table 3 presents a sample size of the DoD population for personnel who 
have been employed for 5 or more years.  Additionally, the participants are more 
educated and have a better understanding of the effectiveness of security education, 
training, and awareness programs.    
Table 3 
 
Characteristics of the Survey Respondents (N = 42) 
Variable Frequency (%) 
Gender  
Male 19 (45) 
Female 23 (55) 
Years employed by Department of Defense of as defense contractor  
5-10 12 (29) 
10-15 11 (26) 
15-20 8 (19) 
20-25 2 (5) 
25-30 1 (2) 
30+ 8 (19) 
Status by pay grade  
O4-O6 2 (5) 
E7-E9 2 (5) 
GS7-GS10 2 (5) 
GS11-GS13 32 (76) 
GS14-GS-15 3 (7) 




A two-way MANOVA was used to analyze whether the perceived effectiveness 
of security education, training, and awareness CBT or IBT programs changes attitudes, 
improve knowledge, and increases skills in identifying insider threats among military and 
DoD civilian personnel and defense contractors.  The descriptive statistics displayed the 
mean and standard deviation for the dependent variable (perceived effectiveness), which 
is split by the independent variables (CBT and IBT programs).  Descriptive statistics 
revealed the following: IBT programs (M = 1.81, SD = .67) are as effective as CBT 
programs (M = 2.26, SD = .86) when understanding, identifying, and reporting insider 
threats.  Additionally, IBT programs (M = 1.83, SD =.66) are as effective as CBT 
programs (M =2.11, SD = .74) when identifying and reporting known acts of espionage 
and unauthorized disclosure.  Further, IBT programs (M = 1.79, SD = .78) are as effective 
as CBT programs (M = 2.26, SD = .77) when comprehending the importance of 
mitigating and thwarting insider threats within the DoD.  Overall annual mandatory 
insider threat security training, education, and awareness programs (M = 1.81, SD = .97) 
are effective.   
Box‘s M Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices was also used to test for 
homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices.  As a result, Box’s M Test of Equality of 
Covariance Matrices proves that the homogeneity of the variance F(28, 2725) = 1.36, p = 
.10 is non-significant.  Additionally, Wilks’s Lambda (Λ) was used to test the statistical 
significance of the different effects of the control and intervening variables (gender and 
status).  The interaction effect determined whether the effect of gender was consistent 
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across different interactions.  Alternatively, but equivalently, the interaction effect 
determined whether the effect of military, DoD civilians, and defense contractors are 
similar for males and females.  If the interaction effect is statistically significant, p < .05.  
Alternatively, if p > .05, the interaction effect is not statistically significant.  Therefore, it 
rejects the null hypotheses because there was no statistically significant interaction effect 
between gender and status on the combined dependent variables, F(14, 54) = 1.63, p = 
.10; Wilks’s Λ = .49.   
The Tukey test was used to determine the relationship between gender and status 
and the perceived effectiveness of security education, training, and awareness CBT and 
IBT programs.  Although, the Post hoc test was not performed for gender and status 
because there were fewer than three groups and at least one group had fewer than two 
cases, the analyses in Table 5 below displays the perceived effectiveness of security 
education, training and awareness CBT and IBT programs based on the gender main 
effect and the gender-by-status interaction effect.  The perceived effectiveness of security 
education, training, and awareness of CBT programs is significant for understanding, 
identifying, and reporting insider threats, F(2, 33) = 4.18, p = .02.  Additionally, 
identifying and reporting known acts of espionage and unauthorized disclosure, F(2, 33) 
= 3.50, p = .04, whereas it is non-significant for comprehending the importance of 
mitigating and thwarting insider threats within the DoD, F(2, 33) = .85, p = .43.  
Conversely, the perceived effectiveness of security education, training, and awareness 
IBT programs is significant for identifying and reporting insider threats, F(2, 33) = 3.26, 
p = .05.  Also, identifying and reporting known acts of espionage, F(2, 33) = 3.77, p = 
80 
 
.03, whereas it is non-significant for comprehending the importance of mitigating and 
thwarting insider threats within the DoD, F(2, 33) = 3.09, p = .06.  Overall, DoD annual 
mandatory insider threat security education, training, and awareness CBT and IBT 
training is significant, F(2, 33) = 6.72, p = .004.   
The relationships between security education, training, and awareness CBT and 
IBT programs and the perceived effectiveness in mitigating and thwarting insider threats 
within the DoD failed to reject the null hypothesis, F(2, 33) = 3.09, p = .06.  In contrast, 
the relationships between security education, training, and awareness CBT and IBT 
programs and the perceived effectiveness of preventing know acts of espionage, 
unauthorized disclosure, or loss of organizational resources rejected the null hypothesis. 
Table 4 
 
Perceived Effectiveness of CBT and IBT Programs (N = 42) 
Dependent Variable M (SD) F(2, 33) p η2 
CBT 
  Reporting IT 
  ID Espionage 
  Mitigating IT 
IBT 
  Reporting IT 
  ID Espionage 












































Note. IT = insider threat 
Finally, Pearson Correlation was conducted to assess the degree that the 
quantitative variables are linearly related in the sample.  According to Green & Salkind 
(2014), one requirement is to consider the two assumptions are underlying the 
significance test for the Pearson correlation and then examine the meaning of the Pearson 
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correlation as an effect size statistic.  There are the two assumptions.  Assumption one is 
that the variable is bivariately normally distributed.  Assumption two is that the cases 
represent a random sample from the population and the scores on variables for one case 
are independent of scores on these variables for other cases.  According to the statistical 
analysis, the variables meet both assumptions.  Correlation coefficients were computed 
among security education, training, and awareness CBT and IBT program effectiveness.  
Table 6 presents the results of the correlational analysis showing 20 out of 21 correlations 
are statistically significant and were greater than or equal to .50 for p < .001 and greater 
than or equal to .33 for p < .005.  
Table 5 
 

























































Note. **p < .001 
*p < .005 
Summary 
The data analysis results addressed the research questions and hypotheses and the 
relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variables.  The 
outcome of the data analysis failed to reject the null hypothesis for the research questions, 
resulting in no statistically significant difference in the perceived effectiveness of CBT 
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and IBT programs on mitigating and thwarting insider threats and preventing known acts 
of espionage, unauthorized disclosure, or loss of organizational resources.  
The results from this research study are significant because it aims to explain why 
the effects of security education, training, and awareness CBT and IBT programs are 
important to defending the country against foreign and domestic enemies.  Also note, that 
the research participants all agree that both security education, training and awareness 
CBT and IBT programs are effective in protecting DoD installations and personnel.  
Chapter 5 will reiterate the purpose and nature of this research study and summarize key 
findings, provide an interpretation of the findings, describe the limitations of the study 
and conclude with recommendations for further research on the perceived effectiveness 




Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, And Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to understand the perceived 
effectiveness of the security education, training, and awareness programs currently 
provided to military, civilian, and government contractors with access to DoD resources, 
organizations, and facilities.  Although DoD has several types of security education, 
training, and awareness programs, I compared the effectiveness of CBT and IBT.  A 
survey was used to assess the benefits and risks of security training, education, and 
awareness and its effectiveness on identifying and reporting insider threats within the 
DoD.  The independent variables were DoD programs designed to mitigate insider 
threats, and the dependent variables were known acts of espionage, unauthorized 
disclosure of information, and any activity resulting in the intentional or unintentional 
loss of organizational resources and/or capabilities from the actions of an insider 
(Defense Security Service, 2014).   
Interpretation of Findings 
Although there is little research about insider threats within the DoD, I was able 
to obtain literature from GAO reports, presidential executive orders and memorandums, 
articles from National Defense and Federal Times journals, U.S. Government policies, 
laws, and DoD policies and regulations.  Past incidents, such as the shootings at Fort 
Hood, Texas and the Washington Naval Yard, involved individuals who had (a) access to 
classified information and systems and (b) an intent to harm national security.  A recent 
shooting incident at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii adds to the list of tragic events involving 
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military personnel who are insider threats.  But security education, training, and 
awareness CBT and IBT programs are effective in preventing more tragic incidents.   
It is important for institutions to pay attention to patterns of behavior displayed by 
military members, DoD civilians, and defense contractors as noted in IAD as well as 
changing DoD’s current culture and organizational behaviors as in the theory of 
organizational culture and change.  Both IAD and the theory of organizational culture and 
change are the best theoretical foundations when it comes to ensuring effective security 
education, training, and awareness CBT and IBT programs.  DoD needs to retain both 
security education, training, and awareness CBT and IBT programs to ensure insider 
threats are mitigated and to prevent known acts of espionage, unauthorized disclosure, or 
loss of organizational resources. 
Limitations of the Study 
Although the G*Power 3.1.9.2 analysis program was used to calculate the 
stratified sample size of 113, DoD IRB limited my research participants to 100.  
However, only 42 DoD personnel volunteered to participant in my study despite 
invitations via both Linkedin and a DoD organization email invitation.  As a result, the 
non-probability sample size was too small resulting in the study being inconclusive. 
Recommendations 
The DoD continues to provide the most up to date TARP, CBT, and IBT 
programs, which is outlined as one of the recommendations in the 2011 GAO report.  
However, the current administration has not provided any updated presidential executive 
orders despite the recent insider threat attack at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.  Since the shooting 
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at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, the DoD is reviewing its current policies and regulations on how 
it can improve security education, training, and awareness CBT and IBT programs to 
mitigate insider threats.  
Based on recommendations from this study, the DoD needs to continue updating 
and maintaining its current CBT and IBT programs to ensure incidents, such as the 
shootings at Fort Hood, Texas, the Washington Naval Yard, and Pearl Harbor, can be 
prevented.  DoD must also learn from the GAO reports, which provide recommendations 
for improving current and future programs.  As for violations of the Espionage Act, the 
DoD must continue incorporating annual training requirements with emphasis on current 
and former military, civilian, and defense contractors who commit acts of espionage 
against the United States.  Further, the GAO needs to continue investigating insider 
threats and providing thorough reports to DoD.  Additionally, I recommend DoD conduct 
an annual review of presidential executive orders and memorandums, laws, and policies 
and regulations and utilize these documents to improve current and future security 
education, training, and awareness CBT and IBT programs.   
Implications 
Protecting classified information and documents from being compromised by 
insider threats within the DoD protects U.S. citizens from terrorist attacks in the United 
States and abroad.  This research addresses gaps in the literature on the effectives of 
security education, training, and awareness programs when identifying and reporting 
insider threats and can provide the DoD with important resources regarding oversight of a 
sensitive issue.  This study was designed to assist the DoD with development and 
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implementation of security education, training, and awareness CBT and IBT programs, 
which mitigate insider threats.  Implications for positive social change include using my 
analysis to assist the DoD with maintaining and developing programs to protect the 
warfighters and nation from terrorist threats and attacks.  DoD’s security education, 
training, and awareness CBT and IBT programs play an important role in ensuring U.S. 
citizens live and work in a safe and secure environment. 
Conclusion 
Security education, training, and awareness CBT and IBT programs are an 
important part of reporting suspicious activity to protect U.S. installations.  
Unfortunately, this study is inconclusive because the study did not use a random sample 
size.  The research study data cannot validate the perceived effectiveness of CBT and 
IBT programs when identifying, reporting, mitigating, and defeating insider threats or 
preventing known acts of espionage, unauthorized disclosure, and a loss of organizational 
resources.  However, it is important for DoD personnel to report any suspicious activities 
on or around U.S. installations because it can be the difference between life or death for 
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